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Part I
Introduction
Throughout history the traditional family always played a critical role in
providing economic means for the old. At the turn of the 19th century
changing social norms and urbanization in Europe lead to a weakening of
the intrafamily link, leaving the old without assistance.1 To overcome the
related problem of old-age impoverishment in 1889 the German Chancellor
Otto von Bismarck introduced the rst public pension scheme, the German
Rentenversicherung. In the following years the Bismarckian system of social
insurance that links contributions and benets spread to most of continental
Europe. Contrary, northern Europe followed a di¤erent way to address the
issue of old-age security by introducing so called social security systems or
Beveridgian2 pension systems. While social security is said to be an Anglo
Saxon tradition, Denmark was the rst country to establish such a pension
system in 1891. The social security scheme is featured by at rate pension
benets that are nanced through common taxation reecting the absence
of a contribution benet link. Nowadays, all countries except the UK that
were originally employing pure social security systems run a multi pillar sys-
tem of partly Bismarckian and Beveridgian components. The increase in
the importance of Bismarckian pension systems can further be underlined
by the tightening of the contribution benet link recently implemented in
various European countries.3 Next to the contribution benet link pension
systems further di¤er in the way the system is nanced. In this context
the existence of intergenerational transfers is separating fully funded and
1Burguiere, Klapisch-Zuber and Segalen (2005).
2Named after the economist and politician William Beveridge who greatly inuenced
the design and implementation of the UK State Basic Pension Scheme introduced in the
late 1940s.
3For a detailed description of indivdual country pension system development see for
example Cigno and Werding (2007).
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pay-as-you-go pension schemes. The former does not include transfers from
the current working generation to retirees, while the later does. Contrary
to traditional, intrafamily nanced pension systems pay-as-you-go pension
schemes do not incorporate interfamily intergenerational transfers but only
intergenerational transfers that are independent of ones own siblings. While
public pension systems throughout the world additionally di¤er in various
other aspects like the extent and the level of coverage the main conceptual
di¤erences are covered by the described way they are nanced and the link
between contributions and benets. Our work focuses on di¤erences related
to pension system nancing and abstracts from the later type of di¤erences
by assuming that the examined pension systems are of dened contribution
type and actuarially fair.
Throughout the literature on economic growth intergenerational redistri-
bution in the form of unfunded pension systems is widely predicted to depress
physical capital accumulation and economic growth through a negative im-
pact on private savings. This theoretical prediction is ambiguously supported
by empirical research initiated by Feldstein (1974).4 Inspired by the mixed
empirical evidence on the sign and magnitude of the social security and sav-
ings correlation, theoretical works have shown that the theoretical predictions
are also not that clear-cut. Models including the e¤ect of social security on
social cohesion and political stability (Sala-i-Martin (1992)) or retirement
decisions (Sala-i-Martin (1996)) for example imply that social security could
well reduce economic growth.
Next to physical capital, endogenous growth theory denes population
size as the second crucial component determining economic growth. There-
fore to clarify economic growth e¤ects of pension systems one additionally
has to consider possible fertility reactions. Empirical results on the relation-
ship of pension systems and fertility (Hohm (1975), Wildasin (1983), Cigno
(1992), Zhang, Zhang (2004), Boldrin, De Nardi, Jones (2005) and Ehrlich,
4A review of the debate can be found in Seater (1993) and Feldstein (1996).
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Kim (2007)) show a negative correlation between pension payments and to-
tal fertility rates. This highlights, that pension systems have the additional
potential to increase economic growth through a positive e¤ect on the capital
labor ratio caused by a reduction in the amount of labor. Economic theory
considers two components to be responsible for the negative e¤ect of pension
systems on fertility. On the one hand a public pension scheme reduces the ne-
cessity of retired people to rely on intergenerational transfers from their own
children, the so called old-age security motive of fertility. This e¤ect, which
was rst mentioned by Neher (1971) can be interpreted as a substitution ef-
fect. On the other hand a public pension system reduces the marginal benet
of children by breaking the link between individual fertility and retirement
budget because pension payments are nanced by the average number and
not by the individual number of adult children (Becker, Barro (1988)). The
resulting free rider problem creates additional downward pressure on fertility
rates.
Following the early works on the inuence of pension systems on fertility
economic literature has picked up the insight about the two existing growth
aspects of pension systems. To our knowledge Becker, Barro (1988) was the
rst work to combine savings and fertility e¤ects of pension systems. In-
side a model with dynastic altruism they show that an unfunded pension
system increases capital intensity and economic growth through an adverse
e¤ect on fertility. While the e¤ect on fertility is unambiguous, further re-
search highlighted that the impact on savings is crucially dependent on the
model framework. First one should mention the change in results connected
to an examination of static models that di¤erentiate between debt and tax
nancing (Cigno, Rosatti (1992, 1996, 1997), Rosatti (1996)). These works
show that unfunded public pension system expansions increase savings and
decrease fertility. Second the results are crucially dependent on the repre-
sentation of fertility in the utility function. Through a strict additive sep-
arability of quantity and quality of children Zhang, Zhang (2004) produced
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the result that unfunded pension contributions decrease fertility and increase
human capital investments and economic growth. Third the importance of
intrafamily intergenerational transfers has to be underlined. Inside an ex-
ogenous fertility model (Barro (1978)) Barro showed already thirty years ago
that the existence of altruistic transfers decides about the inuence of un-
funded pension systems on savings. The same is also true for endogenous
fertility models. Works that do not incorporate positive private intergen-
erational transfers (Ehrlich, Lui (1998), Ehrlich, Kim (2005) and Ehrlich,
Zhong (1998)) show that unfunded pension systems adversely e¤ect savings
and economic growth. Papers assuming positive intrafamily transfers (Yoon,
Talmain (2001) Zhang, Zhang (1995)) produce a positive growth e¤ect of
unfunded pension contributions. This impact is driven by a neutral e¤ect
on savings and a reduction of fertility. The model by Wigger (1999) nicely
covers the e¤ects of di¤erent levels of intrafamily intergenerational gifts on
economic growth. Their results imply that as long as intrafamily transfers
are positive an unfunded pension system is neutral with respect to savings.
This result together with the adverse e¤ect on fertility leads to a positive
growth e¤ect as long as gifts are still positive.
To underline the importance of intergenerational transfers for the growth
implications of pension systems the second part of our study examines the
existence of intrafamily transfers that dene the old-age security motive of
fertility. An OLG model with a mixed procreation motive is employed to
show that the strength of altruism decides about whether socially optimal
unfunded pension contributions are fully crowding out intrafamily gifts. We
show that under realistic assumptions about altruism agents of an economy
with a public pay-as-you-go pension system do not consider the insurance
value of procreation. Our results imply that pension reform implications
for countries with a public pension system should be based on models that
only incorporate the consumption good motive of fertility. This reestablishes
the conventional view about the fact that unfunded public pension schemes
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diminish economic growth.
In the context of fully crowded out intrafamily gifts the third part of our
work analyses the implications of di¤erent pension systems. We show that
the introduction of a public pension system to a developing economy with
informally nanced pension benets reduces fertility and stimulates economic
growth. Additionally, we highlight that in a framework of fully crowded out
gifts a fully funded public pension system results in higher economic growth
than a pay-as-you-go public pension system. This is the case because the
growth enhancing e¤ect of higher fully funded savings is dominating the
growth decreasing e¤ect of higher fully funded fertility.
In the fourth part of the work we employ a three period overlapping gen-
erations model where fertility and investments in the education of children
are chosen endogenously and examine whether di¤erent pension systems af-
fect the set of initial human capital conditions capturing an economy in a low
steady state equilibrium income. We show that education investments are
higher and start at lower income levels for a pay-as-you-go pension system
economy compared to an informal, fertility related one. The income thresh-
old needed to escape the "poverty trap" is therefore lower if a pay-as-you-go
pension system is in place. Moreover, unless the economy is caught in the
low income steady state, a pay-as-you-go pension system supports higher
equilibrium income. In addition we highlight that pension systems inuence
the timing of the demographic transition through their di¤erent valuations of
fertility. This produces an explanation for the observed di¤erences between
developed and developing countries.
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Part II
Consumption Good or Old-Age
Security Investment?
Procreation Motives and their
Pension Reform Implications
1 Introduction
Throughout the endogenous population growth literature two motives of hav-
ing children are present. Individuals decide to have children due to a direct
utility motive (Nerlove et al. (1971), Wolpin (1984), Eckstein, Wolpin (1985))
or due to an investment motive (Neher (1971), Leibenstein (1957)).5 The rst
line of research treats fertility like a usual consumption good o¤ering utility
through a form of descending altruism. Moreover children do not provide any
resources for their parents when they are old. Contrary, in the second line of
research individuals procreate to intertemporally transfer resources. Implic-
itly this approach assumes that adults expect their children to contribute to
their old-age budget and see them as an alternative investment opportunity.
Obviously this egoisticmotive of procreation is only viable if intrafamily
gifts from children to their parents are present.
Results in the pension reform literature highlight that the choice of the
fertility motive plays a crucial role for the implications on economic growth
and population growth. Studies incorporating the utility motive of fertil-
ity support the conventional exogenous fertility view (Feldstein (1974)) that
unfunded, Bismarckian pension schemes are growth reducing. In addition
5A detailed discussion on the two motives can be found in Cigno (1992).
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they imply that the demand for children is ambiguously e¤ected by Bis-
marckian contributions since lifetime income can increase or decrease. This
is the case because unfunded pension contributions decrease adult budget
and the implicit return on pension contributions through a reduction in eco-
nomic growth but increase the base of pension payments. The strength of the
three e¤ects decides about whether lifetime income is increasing or decreasing
(Holler (2007)).6 Authors using the old-age security hypothesis (Yoon, Tal-
main (2001), Junsen Zhang, Junxi Zhang (1995) and Junxi Zhang (1995))
conclude that unfunded pension schemes increase economic growth. This
result is driven through a clear negative e¤ect of unfunded pension contribu-
tions on fertility and intrafamily gifts.
The importance of the fertility motive on procreation behavior becomes
even more obvious by considering the e¤ects of a change in pension benets
for a Beveridgian pension system. A reduction of pension benets that cor-
responds to a lower lifetime income increases fertility if the old-age security
motive of fertility is present but reduces fertility if adults see children as a
consumption good. The existence of an old-age security motive of fertility
decides about the relationship between pension benets and fertility. (Billari,
Galasso (2008)).
Along the lines of the criteria for the existence of a consumption good
motive developed by Nugent (1985) there is a broad consensus on the exis-
tence of the old-age security motive for less developed countries. Contrary,
for developed countries represented by the existence of well dened property
rights and functioning capital markets the insurance motive of procreation
is assumed to be irrelevant. Nevertheless empirical results for developed
countries are ambiguous on the existence of this fertility motive (Rendall,
Bahchievia (1998)).
Our work picks up the lack of clear evidence for the existence of the old-
6To our knowledge Nerlove, Razin and Sadka (1971) were the rst to comment on the
relationship of an additional old-age insurance opportunity (for example: pension systems)
and fertility.
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age security motive of fertility and tries to produce insights on the driving
forces behind the motive. Additionally, we analyze whether in a world of
socially optimal pension contributions an old-age security motive can exist.
The result of this exercise produces an objective rule to decide about fertility
motive modeling in the context of developed countries.
The starting point of our analysis forms a paper by Berthold Wigger
(1999) which can be considered the rst contribution that incorporates a
mixed procreation motive where a consumption and insurance motive of fer-
tility are considered. His model shows that the level of unfunded contribu-
tions decides about the existence of intrafamily gifts and therefore about the
existence of the insurance motive of fertility. In addition, the paper develops
a threshold level of contributions at which gifts are fully crowded out and
outlines the implications for economic growth and population growth.
Inside this model framework we focus on the unaddressed question about
the governmental decision on the pension contribution level and check under
which conditions socially optimal designed contributions correspond to the
threshold where gifts become fully crowded out. This allows us to show
that the strength of altruism is deciding about the existence of the egoistic
procreation motive for countries with an existing unfunded public pension
system. In particular our results indicate that in the case of realistic altruism
parameters an optimally designed unfunded pension system fully crowds out
private gifts from children to their old parents. This implies that unfunded
pension schemes are growth reducing and ambiguously e¤ect fertility.
Our result can be interpreted as a theoretical proof of the intuitive insight
by Nugent and others that the insurance value of children proves irrelevant
for developed countries with a public pension system. Moreover, it implies
that pension reform implications for developed countries should be based on
models that only incorporate the consumption good motive of fertility.
Closest to our work is a paper by Zhang and Zhang (1995), showing
that altruism parameters are deciding about positive gifts for the case of
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a fertility related pension system. Contrary to our approach their model
only incorporates an investment motive of fertility. Children therefore only
produce utility for their parents by contributing to their retirement budget.
Obviously the case of fully crowded out gifts leads to zero fertility under a
Bismarckian pension system and can therefore not be covered by the model.
This is the reason for their assumption of strictly positive gifts that prevents
the paper to draw any conclusions about the existence of an old-age security
motive of fertility in the light of a Bismarckian pension scheme. Through the
use of a mixed procreation motive our model is able to cover this case and
derives conditions for the existence of the old-age security motive.
The rst part of the work recapitulates and develops the model by Wig-
ger (1999) and derives the optimal household solution under a Bismarckian
pay-as-you-go pension system. This is followed by the analysis of the gov-
ernmental problem that maximizes the utility of a representative agent. The
comparison of socially optimal intrafamily gifts and the threshold level of
contribution from the competitive equilibrium solution is performed in the
next part of the work which also derives conditions for the existence of the
old-age security motive. The last part of the work tries to conclude and
reviews the importance of the produced insights for the existing literature.
2 Model
Following the model by Wigger (1999) we consider a Diamond type OLG
model economy populated by nitely living agents belonging to three gen-
erations. Each individual lives for three periods: childhood, adulthood and
retirement. During childhood individuals consume Wt, where  is the frac-
tion of income needed to rear one child.7 During the sole productive period,
7The assumption of income dependent child raising cost is following an approach by
Zhang and Zhang (1995). An alternative to our simple child raising cost formulation would
be to introduce nonlinearities. We abstract from this more realistic complicationsince
the qualitative results would be unchanged.
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adulthood, individuals born at time t 1 earn working incomeWt. Moreover
in this period individuals decide about adult consumption cAt savings st, fer-
tility nt, and gifts to their retired parents qtWt. In addition adults contribute
the income tax  to nance a public pension system. The reection of in-
trafamily gifts implies that adults care altruistically about the well-being of
their parents and allows the model to cover the old-age security motive of
fertility. This implies that children are, next to savings, a second opportunity
to intertemporally transfer income. Next to the ascending altruism in the
form of gifts, individuals preferences include also a descending altruistic part.
In this respect we follow an approach by Eckstein and Wolpin (1985) and
Wolpin (1984) that can be seen as a staticversion of the Barro and Becker
(1988) dynastic utility function. In contrast to the Barro-Becker idea that
adults incorporate the whole utility of their o¤springs in the utility function
we assume that parents value only the number of children. Therefore the dy-
nastic component of the descending altruism is excluded. This allows us to
avoid the incompatibility of descending dynastic altruism and the existence
of the old-age security motive discussed by Cigno (1992). In other words,
descending altruism from adults towards their children treats fertility as a
usual consumption good.
The population dynamics for the productive adult population are de-
scribed by Nt+1 = Ntnt. Retirees are assumed to be unproductive and have
no inuence on household optimization. They only consume the fruits of
their savings, the gifts from their children plus pension benets. Bequests
are excluded from the model.
The preferences of an agent born at period t   1 are represented by the
following logarithmic additive separable utility function:
ut 1(cAt ; c
O
t+1; c
O
t ; nt) = log(c
A
t ) +  log(c
O
t+1) +  log(c
O
t ) +  log(nt) (1)
Individuals born at time t   1 draw utility from adult consumption cAt ,
old-age consumption cOt+1 discounted by the factor , old-age consumption
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of their parents cOt and the amount of children nt. While the utility value of
a child depends on the descending altruism factor , the utility value of one
unit of parents old-age consumption is measured by the ascending altruism
factor .
The budget constraints are given by the adult consumption cAt and re-
tirement consumption cOt+1 of an agent born at time t   1, and the old-age
consumption of the preceding generation cOt .
cAt = Wt(1  nt      qt)  st (2)
cOt+1 = stRt+1 + qt+1Wt+1nt + t+1 (3)
cOt = st 1Rt + qtWtnt 1 + t (4)
Adult consumption is determined by wage Wt, child rearing cost Wtnt,
pension contributions Wt, savings st and gifts qtWt. Old-age consumption
is nanced through interested savings stRt+1 and pension benets t+1. Rt+1
represents the gross interest rate of savings at period t + 1 that is, due to
a perfect foresight assumption, assumed to be known by the agents at the
time of decision in period t. Pension benets t+1 are nanced through a
Bismarckian pay-as-you-go pension system. Notice that the pension system
is assumed to be always budget balanced:
nt 1W t = t (5)
Pension benets of a generation born at period t  2 are nanced by the
average amount of adults in the economy nt 1 times a constant fraction  of
the average labor income W t.
The economy is populated by one representative rm that uses the pro-
duction factors capital Kt and e¤ective labour AtLt to produce a single ho-
mogeneous good at time t. At determines labour productivity at time t which
is assumed to be driven through a Romer type positive spillover. In equilib-
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rium labor demand Lt equals labor supply which is determined by the adult
population Nt. The aggregate constant returns to scale production function
is determined by
Yt = F (Kt; AtNt) (6)
Following Grossman and Yanagawa (1993) the technological spillover is de-
pendent on the fraction of capital per worker and the parameter m which
is a positive technology parameter controlling for the inuence of capital in-
tensity on labor productivity. The lower m the higher is the productivity of
labour.
At =
Kt
mNt
(7)
Now dene capital per e¤ective unit of labour with kt. From (7) we see that
kt is constant and that capital per unit of labour bkt grows at the rate of At.
kt =
Kt
AtNt
= m (8)
bkt = Atm (9)
Prot maximization of the rm implies that production factors are paid by
their marginal products:
FL(Kt; AtNt) =Wt = [f(kt)  f 0(kt)kt]At (10)
FK(Kt; AtNt) = f
0(kt) = Rt (11)
where f(kt)  F (Kt=AtNt; 1).
The return to savings is equal to the marginal product of capital and rm
prots are distributed to capital owners leading to cleared capital markets.
In addition, equation (10) clears the labor market. Due to Walraslaw this
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also implies a cleared goods market. Now we use capital and labor market
clearing conditions and the fact that capital per e¢ cient unit of labor is
constant over time (see equation (8)) to state that gross interest rate Rt and
wage per e¢ cient unit ! = Wt
At
, as well as ! = !
m
are constant.
Rt = f
0(m) = R (12)
! = [f(m)  f 0(m)m] =m (13)
Capital market equilibrium is described by Kt+1 = stNt implying that
capital holdings are fully consumed by the retirees and bequests are zero.
From the labor market clearing condition we conclude that wage is growing
with the level of labor productivity At. This enables us to describe the overall
growth rate of the economy g by the growth rate of technological spill over.
bkt+1bkt = Wt+1Wt = At+1At  g (14)
From equation (14) we already know that per capita output growth is
solely dened by labor productivity growth g. Equation (7) and the capital
market equilibrium imply that savings are growth enhancing and fertility is
growth diminishing reproducing a well known feature of endogenous growth
models (Grossmann, Yanagawa (1993)).
g =
At+1
At
=
Kt+1
mNt+1
Kt
mNt
=
Kt+1Nt
KtNt+1
=
st
ntAtm
(15)
3 Competitive Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium with intergenerational transfers in the form of
pension payments and intrafamily gifts of an agent born at period t 1 is de-
scribed by the solution (a quadruple (nt; qt; st; gt)) to maximizing (1) subject
to budget constraints (2),(3),(4), optimal input prices (10),(11), capital mar-
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ket equilibrium, the growth technology (15) and a balanced pension system
(5).8 The rst order conditions of the maximization problem are represented
by:
qt : u3nt 1 6 u1 with = if qt > 0
nt : u4 + u2qtWt+1 = u1Wt
st : u2R = u1
Where ui denotes the partial derivative of ut 1(cAt ; c
O
t+1; c
O
t ; nt) with re-
spect to the i-th argument. Along a balanced growth path fertility, gifts,
savings and growth are constant, while consumption, wage and capital grow
at the rate g implying that the rst order conditions change to:
q : u3n 6 u1 with = if q > 0 (16)
n : u4 + u2qgWt = u1Wt (17)
s : u2R = u1 (18)
The optimal level of intrafamily gifts, described by rst order condition
(16), implies that altruistic marginal benet of additional parental old-age
consumption equals marginal cost of a reduction in cohort t   1 adult con-
sumption. Individuals optimally decide about fertility by choosing a level
where marginal altruistic utility plus utility derived through intrafamily gifts
equals the utility loss due to a reduction in labor income through child rais-
ing cost (17). The third rst order condition (18) describes optimal savings
behavior which is nothing else than an intertemporal no arbitrage condition.
8The lagrangian for the problem as well as the calculation of the optimal decisions can
be found in the Appendix A.
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Rearranging (16) and (18) describes the connection between the strength of
altruism, the growth factor of the economy gn, and the constant interest rate
R:
gn 6 

R with = if q > 0
Higher descending altruism from adults to their children clearly reduces the
growth factor that represents the internal rate of return of the pension system
while a higher discount factor or gross interest rate increases the growth
factor. The rst order conditions for optimal household decisions yield the
optimal competitive levels of gifts (qc), fertility (nc) and growth (gc). If
intrafamily gifts are positive (qc > 0) we get:
qc =
!(   (1 +  + )) R(1 +  + )
! (1 +  +  + )
nc =
!( (1 + ) + ( + )) R( + 2 +    )
! (1 +  +  + ) 
gc =
R!(1 +  +  + )
!(( + )  (1 + )) R( + 2 +    )
Optimal gifts show that pension contributions  are crowding out gifts. As
long as these gifts are still positive pension contributions  decrease fertility.
This is the case because the reduction of gifts decreases the insurance value
of a child. Empirical results on the inuence of pension systems on fertility
(Hohm (1975), Cigno (1992) and Ehrlich, Kim (2007)) verify the negative
correlation between pension payments and total fertility rates. In addition gc
tells us that unfunded pension contributions are increasing economic growth.
At a certain pension contribution threshold ^ optimal gifts become fully
crowded out. This level of contributions corresponds to an insurance value
of a child equal to zero. In this case adults only procreate because of an
altruisticconsumption good motive.
15
^ =
!  R(1 +  + )
! (1 +  + )
(19)
Obviously the threshold level ^ is inuenced by the strength of altruism.
The discount factor  measures the utility individuals draw from own old-
age consumption. It therefore accounts for time preferences but also for the
degree of selshness in our model. An increase in selshness clearly reduces
the relative utility value of gifts and the threshold level of contributions goes
down. From equation (19) we know that the threshold is smaller than 1
which implies that it is existent for any feasible pension system. If  > ^
gifts become fully crowded out (qc = 0) and optimal household decisions
change to:
nc =
(1  )(R + !)
(!(1 + ) +R(1 +  + ))
gc =
R!
(R + !) 
showing that the level of  decides about whether pension contributions
act fertility increasing or decreasing. Contribution levels above but close to
the threshold lead to an increase of lifetime income because the negative
e¤ect on adult budget and growth can be compensated by the expansion of
the pension payments base. Pension contributions above a second threshold
reduce fertility because lifetime income shrinks due to the intensied growth
and adult budget e¤ects.9 The e¤ect on economic growth is unambiguously
negative.
Although the level of unfunded pension contributions is crucial for fertility
and growth implications, until this point of the study we assumed that it is
exogenously given by the government. We now abstract from this assumption
9For a detailed discussion on the intuition behind this results see Wigger (1999) and
Holler (2007).
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and focus on the governmental decision about  . This allows us to produce a
complete description about the existence of the insurance motive of fertility.
4 Optimal Solution
We assume that the government is maximizing social welfare of a representa-
tive agent born at period t  1. While the optimal solution is dependent on
the economys technology and tastes the private transfer schemes are irrele-
vant. Due to the endogeneity of fertility a price (child raising cost) enters the
governmental budget constraint. This secures that the optimal solution sup-
ports a positive future population. Accordingly, the government maximizes
the steady growing value of ut 1(cAt ; c
O
t+1; c
O
t ; nt) subject to the aggregate re-
source constraint:
cANt + c
O
t Nt 1 +WtNt+1 +Kt+1 = F (Kt; AtNt)
Algebraic reformulation leads to:
cAt
At
+
cOt
ntAt
+
Wt
At
nt + kt+1ntgt = f(kt) (20)
The government chooses the same savings, fertility and capital per ef-
fective unit of labor values for each point in time. Focusing on a steady
state, population is positive and constant and kt+1 = kt = m. Moreover
cOt+1=g
op = cOt where g
op denotes optimal growth for the social planer. The
optimal solution is described by the solution to maximizing (1) subject to
budget constraint (20), optimal input prices (10),(11), capital market equi-
librium, the growth technology (15) and a balanced pension system (5).10
The rst order conditions of the maximization problem are described by:
10The lagrangian for the problem as well as the calculation of the optimal decisions can
be found in the Appendix A.
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cO :

u2 +
u3
gop

gopn = u1 (21)
n : u4 +

u2 + u3
1
gop

qWtg
op = u1Wt (22)
k :

u2 + u3
1
gop

R = u1 (23)
Where ui denotes the partial derivative of u(cA; cO; cO=g; n) with respect
to the i-th argument. The rst equation represents the optimal decision
for old-age consumption of agents. Marginal utility that is generated by
additional old-age consumption of the adult and retiree generation times the
growth factor of the economy (ng) has to equate marginal cost of foregone
adult consumption. Therefore, (21) represents nothing else than the optimal
level of intergenerational transfers. The fertility decision of the social planer
is covered by rst order condition (22). Optimal population size implies that
marginal benet of fertility has to equal marginal cost. Marginal benet of
fertility consists of altruistic utility generated by the existence of children and
utility derived from intrafamily gifts that on the balanced growth path e¤ect
old-age consumption of all living generations. Marginal cost of children are
represented by the fraction of income needed to raise them. The third rst
order condition is an intertemporal no arbitrage condition. Capital holdings
are optimal if the marginal cost are equal to the marginal benet that on a
balanced growth path consist of the utility derived from additional old-age
consumption of the adult and the retiree generation. Equation (23) can be
reformulated to:
gopn = R
linking the growth rate of the economy to the gross interest rate. One should
notice that di¤erent to the optimal household solution the strength of al-
truism does not inuence the optimal level of growth. The internal rate of
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return on pension contributions is equal to the gross interest rate reect-
ing that the economy is dynamically e¢ cient. Di¤erent to agents the social
planer realizes that the optimal decisions do not only e¤ect the budget of a
specic generation but e¤ect all living generations. This is the reason for (21)
to additionally consider the e¤ect of intergenerational transfers on the future
retiree generation and for (22) and (23) also to reect the e¤ect of n and k
on the current retiree generation. The rst order conditions together with
individual budget constraints (2),(3) and (4) lead to the following optimal
solutions:
qop =
!( + ) R(1 +  +  + )
! (1 + 2 + 2 + )
nop =
!( +  + ) R(1 +  + )
! (1 + 2 + 2 + )
gop =
R!(1 + 2 + 2 + )
!( +  + ) R( +  + 1)
The optimal solution for interfamily intergenerational transfers in com-
bination with the threshold level of pension contributions ^ derived in the
previous section of the paper allow us to analyze the existence of the old-age
security motive of fertility.
5 Existence of the Old-Age Security Motive
As already discussed, pension contributions lower than ^ lead to positive
intrafamily gifts implying that the insurance motive of fertility is present.
Assume that the above described Bismarckian pay-as-you-go pension sys-
tem, where the adult generation is obliged to contribute  of their labor
income to nance pension contributions to the old, is in place. A govern-
ment that is maximizing the utility of a representative agent chooses pension
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contributions that follow the optimal rule  op = qop.11 This implies that a
simple comparison of  op and b decides about the existence of the old-age
security motive.
Proposition 1 A public pay-as-you-go pension system with socially optimal
pension contributions leads to fully crowded out gifts if and only if !(2 +
( 1 +    )) 6 R(22   2 + (2 +  + 2)).
Proof. From  op = !(+) R(1+++)
!(1+2+2+)
and ^ = ! R(1++)
!(1++)
we conclude that
^ 6 op if !(2 + ( 1 +    )) 6 R(22   2 + (2 +  + 2)).
This shows that feeling of individuals for their children, their parents and
own adult and retirement consumption, captured in the strength of altru-
ism, decides about the existence of the insurance motive of fertility. The
following Corollary develops a su¢ cient condition to additionally ease the
interpretation of our result.
Corollary 2 If  > 2.and  >  a public pay-as-you-go pension system
with socially optimal pension contributions leads to fully crowded out gifts.
Proof. If  > 2
1+  , !(
2 + ( 1 +    )) is negative.  >  simplies
this expression to  > 2 and secures that R(22   2 + (2 +  + 2)) is
positive. The parameter assumptions  > 2.and  >  therefore satisfy the
necessary condition for a fully crowded out old-age security motive stated in
proposition 1.
We are now in the position to state that for realistic levels of altruism,
where one unit of own parental old-age consumption produces at least the
same utility as one unit of parental old-age consumption ( > 2) and the
feeling for children is at least as strong as the feeling for parents ( > )12,
11Alternatively one could assume that the governmant can not directly decide on the
level of contributions but needs to get approval through a vote. This approach that
is following a paper by Hansson and Stuart (1989) produces additonal support for fully
crowded out gifts in the presence of a public pension system.
12To our knowledge there is no argument that could justify the oposite ( < ), while
the strong evolutionary motive to invest in the survival of the family/clan/society makes
assumption  >  plausible.
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a socially optimal designed pay-as-you-go pension system fully crowds out
interfamily gifts. This further implies that the old-age security motive of
fertility becomes irrelevant.
6 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the e¤ect of an unfunded pension scheme on population
growth and economic growth. To determine fertility endogenously we em-
ploy a mixed procreation motive where individuals draw utility from having
children and benet from intrafamily transfers. The contribution of the pa-
per is twofold. On the one hand we raise attention to the importance of the
di¤erent procreation motives for fertility and growth implications of pension
systems. In particular we show that the existence of an old-age security mo-
tive of fertility decides about whether unfunded pension contributions are
increasing or decreasing economic growth. On the other hand we show that
for a plausible strength of altruism a public pension system fully crowds out
the insurance motive of procreation. This is the case because a socially op-
timal organized pension scheme implements transfers from the young to the
old generation that are higher than the individual optimal level of intergen-
erational transfers. While other authors simply assume that this must be
the case for any political implementable pension contribution level (Hansson
and Stuart (1989)), we derive the result by considering that the government
chooses the contribution level that maximizes the welfare of a representative
agent at the long-run equilibrium. Our results strongly indicate that the old-
age security motive is not present for countries with a public pay-as-you-go
pension system. In this respect, this work can be interpreted as a theoretical
proof of theses already stated in the Nugent criteria for the existence of an
old-age security motive (1985) and Caldwells intergenerational ow theory
(1982). It follows that even for endogenous fertility models an unfunded
public pension system reduces economic growth.
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Appendix A
Competitive Equilibrium
L(cAt ; c
O
t+1; c
O
t ; nt; 
1; 2; 3) = ut 1(cAt ; c
O
t+1; c
O
t ; nt) 1

cAt   (1  nt   qt   )Wt + st

 2 cOt+1   qt+1Wt+1nt  Rst   W t+1nt 3 cOt   qtWtnt 1  Rst 1   W tnt 1
Focs:
cAt : u1 = 
1
cOt+1 : u2   2 = 0
cOt : u3 = 
3
qt :  1Wt + 3Wtnt 1 6 0 with = if qt > 0
nt : u4   1Wt + 2qt+1Wt+1 = 0
st :  1 + 2R = 0
Where ui denotes the partial derivative of ut 1(cAt ; c
O
t+1; c
O
t+1=g; nt) with re-
spect to the i-th argument.
Along a balanced growth path algebraic reformulation leads to:
q : u3n 6 u1 with = if q > 0
n : u4 + u2qgWt = u1Wt
s : u2R = u1
Plug-in the budget constraints to get:
R ((1     n  q)!   gn) = (R + (q + )!) gn
 (R + (q + )!) (gn) + q! (gn) = n!R
gn 6 

R with = if q > 0
If q > 0 solving the equation system leads to:
qc = !( (1++)) R(1++)
!(1+++)
nc = !( (1+)+(+)) R(+
2+ )
!(1+++)
gc = R!(1+++)
!( (1+)+(+)) R(+2+ )
If q = 0 :
gc = R!
(R+!)
nc = (1 )(R+!)
(!(1+)+R(1++))
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Optimal Solution
Focusing on a steady state:
L(cA; cO; n; ) = ut 1(cA; cO; cO=g; n) 
h
cA
At
+ c
O
gopnAt
+ Wt
At
n+ kngop   f(k)
i
Focs :
cA : u1At = 
cO : u2 +
u3
gop
  
gopnAt
= 0
n : u4   

  cO
gopAtn2
+ Wt
At
 +mgop

= 0
k :   (ngop   f 0(k)) = 0
Where ui denotes the partial derivative of ut 1(cA; cO; cO=g; n) with respect
to the i-th argument.
Algebraic reformulation leads to:
cO :

u2 + u3
1
gop

gopn = u1
n : u4 + u1
cO
gopn2
= u1At

Wt
At
 + kgop

k :  u1At (gopn R) = 0
Plug-in the budget constraints to get:
R( + ) ((1  n  q)!   gn)) = (R + q!) (gn)
 (R + q!) (gn) + (q! + q!) (gn) = n! ( + )R
gn = R
Solving the equation system leads to:
qop = !(+) R(1+++)
!(1+2+2+)
nop = !(++) R(1++)
!(1+2+2+)
gop = R!(1+2+2+)
!(++) R(++1)
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Part III
Pension Systems and their
Inuence on Fertility and
Growth
7 Introduction
Developing economies are usually facing a whole bundle of obstacles on their
way to development. Overpopulation, political instability and insecure prop-
erty rights are only some of the problems. Our work tries to contribute to
the topic by analyzing the role of pension systems on fertility and economic
growth. In particular, we are interested in the question whether the intro-
duction of a public pension system in a developing economy has the potential
to promote economic growth.
Throughout the literature a variety of articles analyze population and eco-
nomic growth implications related to pension systems (Becker, Barro (1988),
Cigno, Rosatti (1992, 1996, 1997), Rosatti (1996), Ehrlich, Lui (1998), Ehrlich,
Zhong (1998), Wigger (1999), Yoon, Talmain (2001), Groezen, Leers, Mei-
jdam (2003), Sinn (2004), Boldrin, De Nardi, Jones (2005), Ehrlich, Kim
(2005)). Di¤erent to these works we are focusing on the situation of a de-
veloping country. Following Holzmann (2005)13 we assume that a developing
country is represented by an informal pension system with intrafamily trans-
fers. An informal pension system could be interpreted as a fertility related
pay-as-you-go pension system. In this respect the paper by Zhang and Zhang
(1995) is closest to our work. They analyze fertility and growth implications
13Observes that only 1/5th of the working population in Sub-Saharan Africa is covered
by a highly bureaucratic public pension system where most of the contributions are used
to nance the ine¢ cient structure of the system.
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of fully funded, usual pay-as-you-go and fertility related pay-as-you-go pen-
sion systems in a framework of positive intrafamily gifts. Contrary to their
approach we use the insight, that for realistic altruism assumptions the exis-
tence of a public pension system fully crowds out the old-age security motive
of fertility.14 The intuition behind this result can be explained by Cald-
wells theory of intergenerational wealth ows (Caldwell (1982)). The the-
ory denes two di¤erent types of societies. The traditional/ruraland the
modern society. The traditional/rural society is characterized by low
retirement income that is the reason for children to directly contribute to
the retirement budget of their parents. Translating this into our framework
means that these societies are represented by positive private intrafamily
gifts, or in other words developing societies value the old-age security motive
of fertility. The modernsociety covers the situation of developed countries
with high retirement income. In these economies children are not expected to
contribute to the parental old-age income because private savings plus pub-
lic pension payments are high enough to o¤er a su¢ cient level of retirement
consumption. This implies that the public pension system takes over the role
of private intrafamily transfers, crowds out the old-age security motive and
therefore reduces procreation benets.
Our framework of fully crowded out gifts results in lower economic growth
related to a pay-as-you-go pension system than in Zhang and Zhang because
the negative e¤ect of contributions on capital accumulation can not be o¤set
by a reduction of gifts. Therefore we nd that informal and pay-as-you-go
pension systems are related to lower economic growth than a fully funded
pension system.
Within the pension system and endogenous fertility literature two mo-
tives of having children are prominent. The rst motive captures the fact
that individuals are expected to procreate because they expect their children
14See Hansson and Stuart (1989). For a technical proof of the argument see part one of
this thesis.
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to contribute to their retirement budget. Due to its insurance character,
this motive is known as the old-age security motive of fertility (Leiben-
stein (1957)). The second so called consumption good motiveof fertility
states that parents simply enjoy the fact to have a successor and see children
as a consumption good (Wolpin (1984), Eckstein, Wolpin (1985), Dasgupta
(1993) and Zhang (1995)). Under this motive, children provide utility by
their mere existence. The consumption good motive is present for all pen-
sion systems because procreation is assumed to be a basic need of human
beings. Contrary, due to the fact that gifts are fully crowded out in the pub-
lic pension system case only developing economies value the old-age security
motive. Publicly nanced pension benets are therefore independent of indi-
vidual fertility. This is the reason why models that only consider the old-age
security motive of fertility have to include positive intrafamily transfers in
the form of gifts from adult children to their parents (Bental (1989), Zhang
and Nishimura (1992), (1993), Zhang and Zhang (1995), Morand (1996)) to
treat fertility endogenously. Through the use of a mixed procreation motive
rst introduced by Wigger (1999) which determines the demand for children
simultaneously by the insurance and the consumption good motive our paper
is able to cover the case of fully crowded out gifts while still keeping fertility
endogenously.
Following a zero gift version of the model by Wigger (1999) we formulate
the di¤erent pension schemes inside a Diamond type overlapping generations
model where the engine of growth is captured by labor productivity. Our pa-
per is organized as follows. The rst two chapters develop a model framework
and calculate fertility and economic growth rates for informal, pay-as-you-
go and fully funded pension schemes. Chapter three compares the di¤erent
outcomes to show the impacts of a public pension system introduction to a
developing economy. Chapter four calibrates our model using observed total
fertility and production growth data for the OECD and Sub-Saharan Africa.
Next to the positive e¤ects on economic growth related to the introduction of
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a public pension system, no matter which type, the derived results produce
new insights in the observed fertility di¤erences for the United States and
Europe. Chapter ve concludes and discusses the implications of our results.
8 Model
We consider a Diamond type OLG model economy populated by nitely
living agents belonging to three generations. Each individual lives for three
periods: childhood, adulthood and retirement. Children consume Wt, where
 is the fraction of adult income needed to rear one child.15 During the sole
productive period, adulthood, individuals born at time t earn working in-
come Wt. Moreover in this period households decide about fertility nt, adult
consumption ct, and future retirement consumption ct+1. The population
dynamics for the productive adult population are described by Nt+1 = Ntnt.
Retired people only consume and have no inuence on household optimiza-
tion. We further expect them to consume their whole savings plus pension
benets during their third period of life. Bequests are therefore excluded
from the model.
Following Wolpin (1984) and Eckstein, Wolpin (1985) individuals prefer-
ences include a descending altruisticpart capturing the consumption good
motive of fertility.16 This approach can be seen as a variation of the Barro
and Becker (1988) dynastic utility function. In contrast to their idea that
adults incorporate the whole utility of their o¤springs in the utility function
we assume that parents value only the number of children. In other words we
exclude the dynastic component of the Barro-Becker descending altruism.
15The assumption of income dependent child raising cost is following an approach by
Zhang and Nashimura (1992). Alternative to our simple child raising cost formulation
they include nonlinearities. We abstract from this more realistic complicationsince the
qualitative results would be unchanged.
16While the word altruism implies that actions are made despite any own utility consid-
erations (this is not the case in our model) we stick to the word to pay tribute to earlier
work we are building on.
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Next to the consumption good motive of fertility we additionally model
the old-age security motive of fertility by incorporating ascending altruism.
Inspired by Caldwells intergenerational ow theory we assume ascending al-
truism to be only present for countries without a mandatory public pension
system. Following Bental (1989) ascending altruism of individuals prefer-
ences is captured through gifts from the own adult children to their retired
parents.
We assume that individuals utility is represented by the following loga-
rithmic additive separable function:
Vt = log(ct) +  log(ct+1) +  log(nt) where ;  < 1 (24)
Utility is dependent on adult consumption ct, retirement consumption ct+1,
discount factor , descending altruism factor  and the number of children
nt.
The household budget constraint is represented by adult consumption
ct and retirement consumption ct+1. Adult consumption is dependent on
wage, child rearing cost nt, pension contributions Wt and savings st. Pen-
sion contributions are income dependent with a tax rate  . We additionally
assume perfect foresight implying that individuals exactly know the future
gross interest rate Rt+1. Old-age consumption is nanced through the yield
of savings and pension benets. Notice that the pension system is assumed
to be dened contribution, actuarily fair and budget balanced.
ct = Wt(1  nt   )  st (25)
ct+1 = stRt+1 + t+1 (26)
The economy is populated by one representative rm that uses the pro-
duction factors capital Kt and e¤ective labour AtLt to produce a single ho-
mogeneous good at time t. At determines labour productivity at time t which
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is assumed to be driven through a Romer type positive spillover. In equi-
librium labor demand Lt equals labor supply which is equivalent to adult
population Nt. The aggregate production function is determined by
Yt = F (Kt; AtNt) (27)
Following Grossman and Yanagawa (1993) the technological spillover is de-
pendent on the fraction of capital per worker and the parameter m which
is a positive technology parameter controlling for the inuence of capital in-
tensity on labor productivity. The lower m the higher is the productivity of
labour.
At =
Kt
mNt
(28)
Now dene capital per e¤ective unit of labour with kt. It follows that kt is
constant and capital per unit of labour bkt grows at the rate of At.
kt =
Kt
AtNt
= m (29)
bkt = Atm (30)
Prot maximization of the rm implies that production factors are paid by
their marginal products.
FL(Kt; AtNt) =Wt = [f(kt)  f 0(kt)kt]At (31)
FK(Kt; AtNt) = f
0(kt) = Rt (32)
Firm prots are distributed to capital owners. Therefore capital markets
are cleared if the return on savings is equal to the marginal product of capital
(32). Equation (31) clears the labor market. Due to Walraslaw this further
implies a cleared goods market.
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Cleared capital and labor markets and the fact that capital per e¢ cient
unit of labor is constant over time (see equation (29)) can be used to show
that the gross interest rate Rt and wage per e¢ cient unit wt = WtAt are con-
stant.
Rt = f
0(m) = R (33)
wt = [f(m)  f 0(m)m] = w (34)
The labor market clearing condition furthermore shows that wage is growing
with the level of labor productivity At. This enables us to describe economic
growth by the growth rate of technological spill over g.
bkt+1bkt = Wt+1Wt = At+1At  g (35)
8.1 Informal Pension Scheme
This subsection focuses on the situation of a developing country. In reality
developing and developed countries di¤er in a lot of economic factors. We are
only focusing on the variations of retirement income composition. Developing
countries are mainly represented by a missing or unreliable public pension
system that at the best case only covers a small part of the population.
This results in a level of retirement budget that is below a minimum since
private savings are not high enough to nance a su¢ cient level of retirement
consumption.17 For this reason we assume children to contribute to the
retirement budget of their retired parents in the form of intrafamily gifts.
Caldwell motivated developing societies high fertility levels exactly by these
17The World Bank produces support for the absence of working public pension systems
in developing countries. Due to the World Bank (1991) 70% of the old throughout the
world rely exclusively on informal pension arrangements. International pension coverage
data additionally shows that low public pension system coverage rates correlate with a high
percentage of inhabitants being supported by their own family while for high coverage rates
the opposite is true.
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informal private intergenerational transfers.18
Although private intrafamily transfers are usually freely chosen by the
family members we abstract from heterogeneity in contributions assuming
that developing country contributions are socially mandatory.19 This means
that individuals are forced to contribute by the threat of punishment which
can take the form of exclusion from social village life. The contribution rate
 is therefore not a decision variable but socially determined and constant
over time.
Retirement consumption before gifts which is assumed to be below a
su¢ cient level leads to positive ascending altruistic transfers in the form of
children contributing to their parents retirement budget. The private transfer
system can be interpreted as an informal intrafamily pension system implying
that gifts can be read as pension contributions Wt+1.
An actuarily fair, balanced budget pension system demands that benets
equal contributions at every point in time. Therefore the number of own
children nt times the part of childrens adult income o¤ered as a gift to their
parents Wt+1 has to equal the pension benets t+1.
t+1 = ntWt+1 (36)
Equations (24), (25), (26) and (36) describe the optimization problem of a
representative developing country household. Optimal fertility and savings
decision are covered by the following rst order conditions:
ct =
ct+1
R
(37)
Wt
ct
=

nt
+
Wt+1
ct+1
(38)
Adults have to decide whether to spend their money in the rst or sec-
18Evidence from developing country surveys (Arnold et. al. (1975), Kagitvibasi (1982))
also indicates that old-age security certainly is a fertility motive in developing countries.
19In the absence of legal rules, social norms can evolve self-enforcing (Cigno (1993)).
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ond period. The optimal decision of splitting overall consumption between
the two periods is represented by equation (37), which states that marginal
utility of adult consumption has to equal marginal utility of retirement con-
sumption. An increase in interest rates or a higher discount factor imply that
consumption today will be skipped for consumption tomorrow.
Equation (38) deals with cost and benet of having children. At an
optimum the marginal cost of child rearing must equal the marginal benet
gained through the birth of a child. The marginal benet of having a child
(the right hand side of equation (38)) consists of two parts reecting the
mixed procreation motive. The rst part ( 
nt
) represents the consumption
good value while the second part (Wt+1
ct+1
), measuring the marginal benet
of child investments arising in period t+ 1, captures the insurance value.
Solving the two equations for fertility and savings leads to optimal house-
hold decisions (39) and (40).
st =
(1  )Wt(( + )Wt+1   RWt)
(1 +  + )(Wt+1   RWt) (39)
nt =
R(1  )Wt
(1 +  + )(RWt   Wt+1) (40)
Our assumption of homogeneous agents implies that aggregate savings
can not be negative. We use this fact to obtain the result that the opportunity
cost of having a child have to be equal or larger than the marginal benet of
having a child.
RWt > (1 +


)Wt+1
Through the use of Wt+1 = gWt we can rewrite the expression in constant
terms:
R > g + g (41)
Equation (41) shows that the benets of the two di¤erent types of intertem-
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poral transfers of income from period t to period t+1 (savings and fertility)
are weighted against each other and secures that fertility rates are well be-
haved (positive and nite)20. g represents the insurance value, g the
consumption good value of children. Households optimally choose zero or
negative savings if child investments pay equal or more than saving invest-
ments. If the left hand side is smaller than the right hand side agents are
willing to borrow money in order to get more kids. In this case retirement
consumption is solely nanced by the yield on fertility investments and op-
timal fertility becomes innite. If the equality sign in (41) holds households
are indi¤erent between the two investment opportunities and savings could
become 0. To rule out the case of zero savings we abstract from the equality
sign in (41).
R > g + g
This condition implies that the pension contribution tax rate  is limited by:
max =
R
(1 + 

)g
(42)
Capital market equilibrium demands that future capital is equal to actual
aggregate savings. In our model only retired people, who do not leave any
bequests and totally use up their savings are holding capital. Capital market
equilibrium is therefore described by:
Kt+1 = stNt
Production, household optimization and capital market equilibrium de-
ne a competitive equilibrium with intergenerational transfers. From equa-
tion (35) we already know that per capita output growth is solely dened
by labor productivity growth g. Equation (28) and the capital market equi-
librium imply that savings are growth enhancing and fertility is growth di-
20Fertility is positive and nite if R > g. This parameter assumption is clearly weaker
and already included in (41).
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minishing reproducing a well known feature of endogenous growth models
(Grossmann, Yanagawa (1993)).
g =
At+1
At
=
Kt+1
mNt+1
Kt
mNt
=
Kt+1Nt
KtNt+1
=
st
ntAtm
(28), (35) and the optimal savings and fertility decisions lead to constant per
capita production growth and constant optimal fertility decisions.
g =
Rw
w + w +mR
(43)
n =
R(1  )
(1 +  + )(R  g) =
(1  )(w( + ) +mR)
(1 +  + )(Rm+ w)
(44)
Because fertility and consumption grow at a constant rate the stated
equilibrium is describing the situation of a balanced growth path.
Now we are in the position to analyze the impact of intrafamily pension
system contributions on economic growth. From equation (43) we follow that
pension contributions nanced through intrafamily gifts are growth dimin-
ishing.
@g
@
< 0 (45)
Proposition 3 Informally nanced pension contributions in the form of gifts
from adult children to their parents lead to decreasing per capita production
growth.
To understand the underlying dynamics the growth determining variables
savings and fertility have to be examined. Use optimal savings and equation
(43) to get:
st =
m(1  )RWt
(1 +  + )(w +mR)
Now take the partial derivative of savings with respect to  to see that positive
pension contributions  > 0 are crowding out savings.
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@st
@
=   mR(w +mR)Wt
(1 +  + )(w +mR)2
< 0
Proposition 4 Informal, gift based pension contributions are crowding out
savings.
The result is simply driven trough the fact that gifts are intergenerational
transfers which always crowd out savings. In contrast to savings the e¤ect
on fertility is ambiguous.
@n
@
=
m(   2   2)Rw  m2R2   ( + )w2 2
(1 +  + )(Rm+ w)2
(46)
Proposition 5 Depending on whether  is smaller (bigger) than e inf infor-
mal pension system contributions increase (decrease) fertility. At the contri-
bution level e inf a fertility maximum is reached.
Proof. From (46) we follow that @n
@
> 0 if mRw < (2 + 2)Rw +
m2R2+(+)w2 2. Rearranging yields  <
 mRw(+)+
p
mRw2(mR+w)(+)
w2(+)
=e inf . Contribution levels above this threshold ( > e inf ) decrease fertility
(@n
@
< 0).
The ambiguous reaction of fertility due to the pension contribution rate 
is driven through the fact that the level of pension contributions governs the
reaction of overall lifetime income. To understand this point we have to ex-
amine adult and retirement budget separately. While positive contributions
decrease the adult budget, in our framework of wage dependent contributions
where growth is determining future adult income the e¤ect on the retirement
budget is twofold. Increasing pension contributions increase the base of pay-
ments but also decrease their internal interest rate per child captured by
the rate of economic growth (see equation (45)). The fact that the decrease
of economic growth takes place at an increasing rate21 highlights that each
21 @2g
@2 > 0
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additional unit of contribution rates leads to even stronger marginal interest
decreases. This is the reason why for relatively low contribution levels adult
budget decreases can be compensated by retirement budget increases because
the negative e¤ect on growth is very small. As  is increasing the negative
e¤ect on the internal interest rate becomes stronger while the positive e¤ect
on the base of payments stays constant. From a certain contribution thresh-
old e inf onward, adult budget decreases can not be compensated. Lifetime
income decreases and the demand for children goes down.
Independent of contribution rates,  > 0 always leads to lower economic
growth (45). Therefore the case where  > e inf (informal pension contri-
butions decrease fertility) implies that the growth decreasing e¤ect of lower
savings is dominant. If  < e inf , fertility and savings e¤ects are both growth
decreasing (fertility increases and savings decrease).
8.2 Pay-as-you-go Public Pension Scheme
In this subsection we focus on fertility and growth implications caused by a
pay-as-you-go pension scheme. In reality children support their parents for
a variety of reasons. Ascending transfers can for example be motivated by
altruism that takes place only because parents are in need. Alternatively
one could assume that transfers are part of an intergenerational exchange in-
corporating a connection between transfers and bequests. Since we exclude
bequest from the analysis our model only captures the altruistic transfer
motive. In this framework the introduction of a public pension system, guar-
anteeing a minimum retirement wage, fully crowds out transfers (gifts) from
adult children to their parents. This is the case because donors (adult chil-
dren) no longer see the need to provide transfers. In contrast to developing
economies with informal pension systems, pension benets are not dependent
on own fertility decisions nt but on the average fertility of the whole economy
nt. Furthermore pensions are also independent of individual future adult in-
come of children. In a public pension system the average future income Wt+1
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of children instead of Wt+1 enters the pension benet formula. An actuarily
fair, balanced budget pay-as-you-go public pension system demands:
t+1 =  nt Wt+1
While production and capital market stay the same the di¤erence in pen-
sion funding changes the household optimization problem. This change is
represented by the new retirement budget constraint:
ct+1 = stR +  nt Wt+1
Notice that  is now a policy decision variable instead of a socially determined
rate. Household optimization leads to the following rst order conditions:
1
ct
=
R
ct+1
Wt
ct
=

nt
While the rst equation handling the optimal split between present and
future consumption is the same as in the informal pension contribution case,
the second equation dealing with cost and benet of having children changes.
This fact is due to the change in marginal benet of having children which
now only reects the consumption good motive of fertility since fully crowded
out gifts made the insurance motive of fertility obsolete.
In our model we assume homogeneous agents. Therefore nt and Wt+1 can
be set equal to nt and Wt+1 after the optimization. The stated rst order
conditions dene the optimal household solution for fertility and savings.
st =
(1  )Wt(Wt+1   RWt)
Wt+1   (1 +  + )RWt
nt =
R(1  )Wt
(1 +  + )RWt   Wt+1
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Similar to the informal pension system model we assume positive aggre-
gate savings. This implies that the marginal opportunity cost of having a
child R have to be higher than the marginal benet of procreation g.
R > g (47)
The condition securing positive and nite fertility22 is like in the previous
model weaker and included in the condition for positive savings. Pension
contribution tax rate  for the pay-as-you-go pension system is also bounded
from above. Contribution rates above max would harm the non-negativity
assumption of savings because investments in savings would be less protable
than investments in fertility.
max =
R
g
The relationship between savings, fertility and labor productivity (g =
st
ntAtm
) resulting from capital market equilibrium and input prices together
with optimal savings and fertility decisions dene constant per capita pro-
duction growth.
g =
Rw
(mR + w)
(48)
Use the result for g to show that also optimal fertility is constant.
n =
R(1  )
(1 +  + )R  g =
(1  )(Rm+ w)
((1 +  + )mR + (1 + )w)
(49)
After the equilibrium description which represents the situation of a bal-
anced growth bath we focus on the impact of pay-as-you-go pension contri-
butions on per capita growth. Use the rst derivative of equation (48) with
22(1 +  + )R > g
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respect to  to show that contributions act growth diminishing.
@g
@
< 0
Proposition 6 Pay-as-you-go pension system contributions decrease eco-
nomic growth.
The reason for this negative impact lies again in the behavior of fertility
and savings. Use Wtg = Wt+1 and equation (48) to reformulate optimal
savings.
st =
mRWt(1  )
mR(1 +  + ) + w(1 + )
Now derive st with respect to  to see that a pay-as-you-go pension system
reduces savings.
@s
@
=  mRWt(w(1 + ) +m(1 +  + )R)
(mR(1 +  + ) + w(1 + ))2
@s
@
< 0
Proposition 7 Pay-as-you-go pension system contributions intergenerationally
redistributes resources from young to old. This crowds out private savings and
reduces capital accumulation.
Our assumption that a public pension system fully crowds out private
intrafamily gifts is the reason why the savings reducing e¤ect of pay-as-you-
go contributions can not be o¤set by reduced gifts like in Yoon, Talmain
(2001).
To see the e¤ect of a pay-as-you-go pension system on fertility, we built
the derivative of (49) with respect to  .
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@n
@
=  (m
2R2(1 +  + ) +mRw(2(1 + ) + (2   1)) +  2w2(1 + ))
(mR(1 +  + ) + w(1 + ))2
(50)
Proposition 8 Depending on whether  is smaller (bigger) than e pay, a pay-
as-you-go pension system increases (decreases) fertility. At the contribution
level e pay a fertility maximum is reached.
Proof. From (50) we follow that @n
@
> 0 only if  (m2(1 +  + )R2 +
m(2(1+)+(2 1))Rw+(1+) 2w2) > 0. Now solve this expression for
 and rearrange it to get  <
 mRw(1++)+
p
mRw2(w(1+)+mR(1++))
w2(1+)
= e pay.
Contribution levels above this threshold ( > e pay) decrease fertility (@n
@
< 0).
Similar to the informal pension system, pay-as-you-go pension contribu-
tions imply ambiguous fertility e¤ects. Pay-as-you-go pension contributions
decrease the adult budget while the retirement budget can increase or de-
crease. The retirement budget e¤ect is again dependent on a trade-o¤ be-
tween the base of pension payments and the internal interest rate of the
pension scheme. Higher contributions increase the base of pension payments
but decrease the internal interest rate because future income goes down. The
pension contribution rate  again decides about whether the fertility increas-
ing e¤ect of higher pension payments base or the fertility decreasing e¤ects
of lower pension interest and lower adult budget are dominant.
Notice that if  > e pay implying that @n
@
< 0 the savings reducing e¤ect
of a pay-as-you-go pension system is stronger than the fertility decreasing
e¤ect because the overall growth e¤ect is always negative (@g
@
< 0).
8.3 Fully Funded Public Pension Scheme
We again follow the already stressed argument that intrafamily gifts are
not considered in the household optimization if a public pension system is
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present. Compared to the previous subchapter only the retirement bud-
get constraint and the capital market equilibrium change. Pension benets
are now nanced through own contributions during adulthood which are in-
vested in the capital market, paying the gross interest rate Rt+1. Because no
transfers from children to their parents are taking place fertility completely
exits the retirement budget constraint. The balanced budget pension system
constraint changes to:
t+1 =  WtRt+1
This clearly also changes the capital market equilibrium because the ad-
ditional investments have to be considered. Notice that we again assume
perfect foresight. Capital market equilibrium is represented through:
Kt+1 = Nt(st + Wt)
The rst order conditions of the household optimization problem again
control the equalization of marginal benet over time and between the two
di¤erent investment opportunities.
1
ct
=
R
ct+1
Wt
ct
=

nt
Solving for st and nt gives us the optimal household decisions:
st =
Wt
(1 +  + )
  Wt
n =

(1 +  + )
Aggregate savings are positive as long as  > (1++). Therefore the
maximum pension contribution tax is determined by:
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max =

(1 +  + )
Input prices and the new capital market equilibrium condition dene
economic growth g.
g =
bkt+1bkt = Kt+1NtKtNt+1 = st + WtntAtm
Use optimal fertility and savings decision to show that g is constant.
This implies together with constant fertility that the equilibrium denes a
balanced growth path equilibrium.
g =
w
m
Growth and fertility are independent of  , implying that a fully funded
pension system has no inuence on equilibrium per capita growth. The only
e¤ect of a fully funded pension system is a reduction of savings which is equiv-
alent to the amount of pension contributions. Pension contributions, invested
in the capital market, exactly work like savings o¤setting the impact of fully
funded pension contributions on capital accumulation. Consumers anticipate
additional future payments and therefore reduce savings exactly by the same
amount reproducing the Ricardian equivalence theorem which states that
economic growth is neutral towards fully funded pension contributions.
@nt
@
= 0;
@g
@
= 0
Proposition 9 A fully funded pension system has no impact on economic
growth and fertility.
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9 Public Pension System Implementation
This section highlights the per capita growth and fertility impacts of a public
pension system introduction to a developing economy. In the rst step an
informally organized pension system is compared to a pay-as-you-go public
pension system. Variables with indices inf and pay respectively indicate the
informal and pay-as-you-go case. For a direct comparison of the results one
has to assume that the part of income used for private intergenerational gifts
 of the informal system is equal to the pension contribution tax rate  of
the pay-as-you-go system. All variables except fertility and economic growth
are assumed to be independent of the pension system. To analyze growth
implications, one has to start by examining the e¤ects on fertility and savings.
Optimal fertility decisions for the two pension systems are represented by:
ninf =
(1  )(w( + ) +mR)
(1 +  + )(Rm+ w)
npay =
(1  )(Rm+ w)
((1 +  + )mR + (1 + )w)
Proposition 10 An introduction of a pay-as-you-go pension system to an
economy with informal pension system leads to lower population growth.
This is the case since the fertility increasing old-age security motive is
completely crowded out by the public pension system.
Proof. Rewrite optimal informal fertility to get:
ninf =
1 + w
(Rm+w)
1 + w
(1++)mR+(1+)w| {z }
>1
 (1  )(Rm+ w)
((1 +  + )mR + (1 + )w)| {z }
npayt
Since the rst term is bigger than 1 informal fertility is higher than pay-as-
you-go fertility (ninf > npay).
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An economy without a public pension system is represented by children
that are nancing the pensions of their parents. Therefore Individual fertility
decision has a direct inuence on retirement consumption. A pay-as-you-
go public pension system nances pensions through the average number of
children. Therefore instead of own the average number of fertility enters
the retirement budget constraint neglecting the security motive of fertility
in the household optimization. In other words, economies with a pay-as-
you-go public pension system are represented by households which do not
expect own fertility decisions to have an inuence on their pension benets.
Households living in an economy with informal pension system clearly do so
because their pension benets are paid directly by their own children. This
is the reason for the marginal benet of procreation to decrease if a public
pension system is introduced because the security value of fertility cancels
out.
Now compare savings sinf and spayt to see that the introduction of a pay-
as-you-go pension system increases savings.
sinf =
mRWt(1  )
(1 +  + )(w +mR)
spayt =
mRWt(1  )
mR(1 +  + ) + w(1 + )
Proposition 11 An introduction of a pay-as-you-go pension system to an
economy with informal pension system acts savings increasing (sinf < spayt ).
Savings are higher in the pay-as-you-go pension system because marginal
benet of fertility is lower which transfers income from procreation to savings.
After the examination of savings and fertility we know that both growth
determining variables indicate that economic growth is higher for the pay-
as-you-go pension system.
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ginf =
Rw
w + (mR + w)
gpay =
Rw
(mR + w)
Proposition 12 The introduction of a pay-as-you-go pension system to an
economy with informal pension system increases economic growth since fer-
tility decreases and savings increase.
Our outcomes are closely connected to the results derived by Zhang and
Zhang (1995) who show that a pay-as-you-go public pension system increases
per capita output growth and reduces fertility compared to a fertility related
pension system. In contrast to Zhang and Zhang we do not only model as-
cending transfers from adult to old but also descending transfers from adult
to the young by including the consumption good motive of fertility. This en-
ables us to study the pay-as-you-go public pension system with endogenous
fertility in a framework of fully crowded out private transfers. Zhang and
Zhang that are only modeling the old-age security value of children can not
cover this case. Their model can be seen as dealing with the transition pe-
riod between an informal system and a public pension system where private
gifts are still positive nevertheless a public social security system is already
present. Our model is focusing on the nal period when the transition is
already nished. The di¤erent periods could be reasoned by di¤erent levels
of trust in the public pension system. People do not fully trust the public
system during the adjustment period and therefore still support their parents
with private gifts. The nal period is characterized by zero gifts because the
households have already adjusted their behavior. Our assumption of fully
crowded out private gifts does not change the direction of the growth e¤ect
described by Zhang and Zhang but changes its level. In our model a pay-as-
you-go pension system introduction leads to lower future capital and lower
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per capita growth compared to the Zhang and Zhang approach. This is the
case because their model compensates the negative e¤ect of pension contri-
butions on capital accumulation through a decrease of gifts. Our assumption
of fully crowded out gifts omits this reaction.23
After clarifying the growth and fertility impacts caused by a pay-as-you-
go public pension system introduction we focus on the impacts of a fully
funded (superscript ¤ ) public pension system introduction which is the most
prominent alternative to a pay-as-you-go public pension system in reality.
Use the results from the pervious sections to compare informal and fully
funded fertility:
ninf =
(1  )(w( + ) +mR)
(1 +  + )(Rm+ w)
n¤ =

(1 +  + )
Proposition 13 The level of the pension system contribution tax  decides
about whether the introduction of a fully funded system to an economy without
working pension scheme leads to lower or higher population growth. While
for positive  < 
+
  Rm
w(+)
informal fertility is higher than fully funded
fertility,  > 
+
  Rm
w(+)
or 
+
< Rm
w(+)
result in lower informal fertility
than fully funded fertility. Informal and fully funded fertility are identical if
 = 
+
  Rm
w(+)
.
Proof. Rewrite informal fertility to get:
ninf =

(1 +  + )| {z }
n¤
 (1  )(w
1

+ w +mR)
(Rm+ w)
For positive pension contributions three cases are observable:
23In addition, Holler (2009) shows that for reasonable altruism parameters, a socially
optimal designed pension system fully crowds out the old age security motive which makes
positive intrafamily gifts unrealistic.
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 Case 1: if  < 
+
  Rm
w(+)
, the second term of ninf is bigger than 1
and ninf > n¤ .
 Case 2: if  = 
+
  Rm
w(+)
, the second term of ninf cancels out and
ninf = n¤ .
 Case 3: if  > 
+
  Rm
w(+)
or 
+
< Rm
w(+)
, the second term of ninf is
smaller than 1 and ninf < n¤ .
The di¤erent cases are showing that the amount of income contributed
to the pension system decides whether fertility is higher or lower. This is
the case because informal fertility can decrease or increase depending on
whether the decreasing e¤ect on informal growth and available adult income
or the increasing e¤ect on pension paymentsbase is stronger. The contrary
e¤ects are exactly o¤set if  = 
+
  Rm
w(+)
. In this case informal and
fully funded fertility are equal and independent of contribution payments. If
 < 
+
  Rm
w(+)
the e¤ect of lower informal growth and lower available adult
income is weaker than the e¤ect due to increasing pension payments base
and informal fertility is higher than fully funded fertility.  > 
+
  Rm
w(+)
implies exactly the opposite leading to lower informal fertility than fully
funded fertility.
After the description of the fertility e¤ect we focus towards the capital ac-
cumulation e¤ect to fully understand the overall growth e¤ect. A fully funded
pension system invests the whole part of income reserved for retirement con-
sumption in the capital market and therefore reaches the same capital stock
than without a pension system. Capital holdings are clearly higher than in
the informal case leading to a growth enhancing e¤ect since in the Grossmann
Yanagawa endogenous growth model growth is driven by labor productivity
determined by capital intensity.
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ginf =
Rw
w + w +mR
g¤ =
w
m
ginf < g¤
Proposition 14 The introduction of a fully funded public pension system to
an economy with informal pension system increases economic growth.
This implies that even for case 2 where fully funded fertility is higher, the
growth increasing e¤ect of higher capital accumulation is dominant.
Now we are in the position to state that countries aiming to increase per
capita production growth should introduce a public pension system no matter
whether the system is funded or unfunded. If the main goal is to decrease
population growth only the pay-as-you-go pension system is useful for all
contribution levels. To draw light on the question whether it is preferable to
introduce a funded or unfunded system we now focus on the comparison of
the two public pension systems.
Pay-as-you-go fertility and fully funded fertility are represented through:
npay =
(1  )(Rm+ w)
((1 +  + )mR + (1 + )w)
n¤ =

(1 +  + )
Proposition 15 The tax rate level  decides about whether pay-as-you-go
fertility is higher or lower than fully funded fertility. If 0 <  < 
(1++)
  Rm
w
fertility is higher in the pay-as-you-go system (npay > n¤ ). If  > 
(1++)
 
Rm
w
or 
(1++)
< Rm
w
fertility is lower in the pay-as-you-go system (npay <
n¤ ). For the case where  = 
(1++)
  Rm
w
both systems lead to identical
fertility decisions.
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Proof. Reformulate pay-as-you-go fertility to get:
npay =

(1 +  + )| {z }
n¤
 (1  )(Rm+ w)
mR + (1 + )w 1
(1++)
Now check if the second term on the right side is smaller, bigger or equal to
1. Therefore analyze if the nominator (1  )(Rm+ w) is bigger or smaller
than the denominator (mR + (1 + )w 1
(1++)
).
 Case 1: if  < 
(1++)
  Rm
w
the second term is bigger than 1 and
npay > n¤ .
 Case 2: if  = 
(1++)
  Rm
w
the second term is equal to 1 implying that
npay = n¤ .
 Case 3: if  > 
(1++)
  Rm
w
or 
(1++)
< Rm
w
the second term is smaller
than 1 and npay < n¤ .
The three cases are corresponding to the variable dependent strength of
the pay-as-you-go contribution e¤ects on fertility. If contributions are low
enough (Case 1) the fertility increasing e¤ect of higher pension payments base
dominates the fertility diminishing e¤ect of lower growth and lower available
adult income for the pay-as-you-go pension system. This is supporting higher
fertility in the pay-as-you-go pension system. At a certain contribution level
(Case 2) the contrary fertility e¤ects are exactly o¤set implying equal fertility
for both pension schemes. Taxation above this critical level (Case 3) leads
to negative growth and adult budget e¤ects that are larger than the positive
e¤ect of higher pension payments base. In this case fertility in the pay-as-
you-go pension system becomes lower than in the fully funded system.
Figure 1 summarizes the already obtained fertility insights for the three
pension schemes.
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Figure 1: Fertility comparison for di¤erent contribution levels
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Now assume a Cobb-Douglas production function of the form:
F (AtLt; Kt) = K

t (AtLt)
1 
Use the results for factor prices w = m(1   ) and R = m 1 to
reformulate the threshold contribution level for the three above mentioned
cases:
 R 
(1 +  + )
  
1  
If we set  equal to 1=3 which is standard in the literature case 2 is true
because  ;  and  are positive and smaller than 1.
Proposition 16 If the production function is Cobb-Douglas and  = 1=3
pay-as-you-go fertility is lower than fully funded fertility (npay < n¤ ).
While the general result for fertility is case dependent, the result for
economic growth is not. Per capita production growth corresponding to the
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funded pension system is always higher than growth for the pay-as-you-go
scheme.
gpay =
Rw
(mR + w)
g¤ =
w
m
Proposition 17 A pay-as-you-go pension system leads to lower economic
growth than a fully funded pension system (gpay < g¤ ).
This highlights that our model reproduces the classical result for exoge-
nous fertility models by Feldstein (1974). From the derivation of growth
we know that the model exhibits two growth e¤ects. Capital is growth en-
hancing and fertility is growth diminishing. If fully funded growth is always
higher than pay-as-you-go growth despite higher fully funded fertility for
the Cobb-Douglas case with  = 1=3, fully funded capital holdings have to
be higher than the pay-as-you-go ones. We follow that savings plus pen-
sion contributions corresponding to a funded pension system are higher than
pay-as-you-go savings (s¤ +  Wt > s
pay
t ). To understand the result one has
to examine the di¤erent e¤ects on capital accumulation. While all pension
contributions are always reducing savings because they transfer income to
the future and reduce uncertainty, the type of the system decides about the
impact on capital accumulation. Fully funded pension contributions exactly
act like savings because they are invested in the capital market and therefore
do not change capital accumulation. In contrast pay-as-you-go contributions
which go directly from the adults to the old reduce future capital despite
the fact that pay-as-you-go savings can be higher than fully funded savings.
This is the case because contributions are not invested in the capital market
and the savings reducing e¤ect of pension contributions can not be o¤set.
The result that pay-as-you-go growth is always lower than fully funded
growth further implies that the growth enhancing e¤ect of lower pay-as-you-
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go fertility can not compensate the growth decreasing e¤ect of lower pay-
as-you-go future capital. This is contrary to the ndings of Yoon, Talmain
(2001) who study exactly the same question similar to the already mentioned
Zhang and Zhang model in a positive private transfer framework without
descending altruism. The di¤erent result is again driven by the assumption of
zero intrafamily intergenerational transfers which omits the growth increasing
e¤ect of gift reductions.
10 Calibration
The theoretical results obtained in the previous sections show that pension
systems inuence growth through impacts on fertility and capital accumula-
tion. While the growth impacts of the di¤erent pension systems can clearly
be ranked, the variable values of R;m;w; ;  and  decide whether fully
funded fertility is higher or lower than informal fertility. In order to clarify
the fertility ranking, we calibrate our model for an average OECD as well
as for an average Sub-Saharan country inside a Cobb-Douglas production
function economy.
The parameters are chosen such that the balanced growth path equilib-
rium matches the empirical features of an average OECD country with a
pay-as-you-go pension system. Periods have a length of 30 years implying
a life expectancy of 90 years. Due to empirical ndings we set capital pro-
ductivity  equal to 1=3. The discount factor  is assumed to be 0:99 per
quarter of a year corresponding to the standard real-business-cycle literature.
In our 30 years per adult period framework this corresponds to 0:99120. Fol-
lowing Doepke and De la Croix (2003) child rearing cost corresponds to 15%
of adult working time. These cost only arises if children are still living with
their parents. We assume that this is the case for half a period reducing the
loss of working time to 7:5%. We use this value as a proxy for  to capture
the opportunity cost of children. Pension contribution rate  is chosen to
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equal the OECD average of 30%. This number together with child rearing
costs limits maximum fertility to 5:7 children per person. We further choose
the descending altruism factor  to be 0:142 and the technology parame-
ter m controlling the inuence of capital intensity equal to 0:0069 because
these variables reproduce a steady state fertility rate at the reproduction
level nt = 1 and a steady state per capita output growth rate of 2% per year.
The values of m and  are further implying an interest rate of 7:67%.
The chosen variable values reproduce our theoretical result that the pay-
as-you-go system leads to lowest fertility. Additionally we show that for the
observed contribution rate informal fertility is clearly higher than fully funded
fertility. This is the case since the fertility increasing e¤ect of higher pension
payments base is dominating the fertility decreasing e¤ects of reduced growth
and adult budget. Only if pension contributions are unrealistically larger
than 51:6% of adult income the fully funded system produces higher fertility
than the informal one (see table 1). Since aggregate savings can not be
negative these cases can be excluded (see equation (42)) and we follow that
informal fertility is higher than fully funded fertility.
Table 1: Fertility dependence on   = 0:3  = 0:516  = 0:7
nt gt nt gt nt gt
Informal Pension System 1:65 1:01 1:31 0:69 0:88 0:54
Pay-as-you-go Pension System 1 1:81 0:71 1:43 0:45 1:21
Fully Funded Pension System 1:32 2:9 1:32 2:9 1:32 2:9
A plot of the results (see gure 2) shows that informal fertility creates a
hump shaped curve in a fertility and pension contribution rate plane. The
behavior of the curve is reecting the strength of the underlying e¤ects which
are dependent on the level of pension contributions  . Hump shaped behavior
can only be observed for the informal pension system where the old-age secu-
rity motive is still present. As the contribution payments per child increase
the insurance motive becomes less important while the negative growth e¤ect
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becomes stronger. At the fertility maximum the e¤ects are o¤set. A further
increase of  leads to decreasing fertility. Despite the narrow scope of our
simple analysis the comparison of fully funded and pay-as-you-go fertility
suggests that fertility di¤erences between the US and Europe can partly be
explained by the di¤erent types and not only by the di¤erent contribution
levels ( Boldrin, De Nardi and Jones (2005)) of the pension systems. The
US, where pensions are mainly nanced through a funded system show a
Total Fertility Rate (TFR) of 2, while Europe, represented through mainly
pay-as-you-go pension systems, shows a TFR of 1.4.
Figure 2: Fertility OECD
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Figure 3 shows the growth diminishing e¤ect of an increase in the pension
contribution rate for an informal and a pay-as-you-go pension system. Fol-
lowing our theoretical results, the pay-as-you-go growth level is always higher
than the informal one since growth reducing fertility is lower and growth in-
creasing savings are higher. If the contribution rate is too high the informal
as well as the pay-as-you-go pension system could lead to negative growth.
Fully funded growth is graphically represented by a horizontal line since it is
independent on the pension contribution rate.
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Figure 3: Per capita growth OECD
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The second numerical example is dealing with developing countries. There-
fore the parameters are chosen such that the balanced growth path equi-
librium matches the empirical features of an average Sub-Saharan country.
Periods now have a length of 15 years implying a life expectancy of 45 years.
Capital productivity and the discount rate per quarter are equal to the OECD
case ( = 1=3 and  = 0:99). In this framework the discount rate corresponds
to the value  = 0:9960. Child cost measured through the parameter  are
expected to be lower than for the OECD case since in informally organized
societies children are looked after by a broader sense of the family which can
even take the form of a village unity. This clearly reduces the opportunity
cost of children. Taking  = 0:075 for OECD Countries into account we
choose child raring cost for developing countries to be equal to 0:042. This
number leads together with the observed fertility rate of 2:75 24 to a descend-
ing altruism factor  equal to 0:117 which is only slightly smaller than the
value for the OECD case. This is creating additional support for our child
rearing cost choice since we can not see any reason why descending altruism
representing the genetic imprint to procreate should be much di¤erent for
developing countries. The parameterization of  for the developing coun-
try case is quite tricky since no data about social mandatory contribution is
24World Population Data Sheet 2006.
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available. Therefore we again use the observed average benets for OECD
countries which are around 30% of working income and divide them through
the steady state level of fertility to get  = 0:11. We implicitly assume that
30% of adult working income plus the own fruit of savings are high enough
to nance a su¢ cient level of retirement consumption. We further use the
growth rate of 0:6%25 per year to set the technology parameterm, controlling
the inuence of capital intensity on labor productivity, equal to 0:012. The
technology parameter which is governing the transition of capital intensity
to labor productivity m is higher than the OECD one, reecting the lower
technological standard. Our numerical developing country example implies
an interest rate of close to 13% what can partly be justied by existing risk
prime.
Our variable values again result in lowest fertility for the fully funded
system (see table 2). An unrealistically high contribution rate of  = 73:5%
is needed to equal fertility levels for the informal and fully funded pension
system. Positive aggregate savings again exclude these high levels of the
contribution rate. Our example therefore implies that the informal pension
system leads to lower fertility than the fully funded one.
Table 2: Fertility dependence on   = 0:11  = 73:5  = 0:8
nt gt nt gt nt gt
Informal Pension System 2:75 1:09 1:68 0:26 1:3 0:24
Pay-as-you-go Pension System 1:59 2:01 0:55 0:99 0:42 0:95
Fully Funded Pension System 1:68 2:46 1:68 2:46 1:68 2:46
Graphical examination of the outcomes (see gure 4) shows that pay-
as-you-go fertility and informal fertility, drawn in a fertility and pension
contribution rate plane, create a hump shaped curve. Increasing pension
contribution rates are leading to increasing fertility as long as the positive
utility e¤ect through higher retirement budget is dominant. At the maximum
25Sub-Saharan average for 1990-2004.
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the increasing e¤ects are o¤set by the decreasing growth and adult budget
e¤ects. From this level of  onwards fertility is decreasing.
Figure 4: Fertility Sub-Saharan Africa
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Figure 5 shows the growth diminishing e¤ect of an increase in the pension
contribution rate for an informal and a pay-as-you-go system. Like in the
theoretical results prompted the pay-as-you-go growth level is always higher
than the informal one since growth reducing fertility is lower and growth
enhancing savings are higher. Fully funded growth is graphically represented
by a horizontal line since it is independent on the pension contribution rate.
Figure 5: Per capita growth Sub-Saharan Africa
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Now we are in the position to give a full description of the impacts corre-
sponding to a public pension system introduction to a developing economy.
The fully funded pension system clearly leads to the highest per capita growth
while the pay-as-you-go one produces the lowest fertility rates. Dependent
on whether a reduction in fertility or an increase of per capita growth is
the main goal of a governmental program a pay-as-you-go or a fully funded
pension system should be introduced.
11 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the growth promoting potential of a public pension sys-
tem introduction to a developing economy. We show that no matter if the in-
troduced public pension scheme is funded or pay-as-you-go the consequences
on economic growth are positive.
A pay-as-you-go pension system introduction increases per capita growth
through higher capital accumulation and lower fertility. Introducing a funded
pension scheme also increases capital accumulation while the demand for chil-
dren can increase or decrease depending on the level of pension contribution
 . The overall e¤ect on economic growth is nevertheless again positive. This
is the case because the growth enhancing e¤ect of higher future capital is
dominating the possible growth diminishing e¤ect of higher fertility. The
calibration of the model further shows that realistic contribution levels ex-
clude the case of increasing fertility.
Within the debate about the impact of di¤erent public pension systems on
growth, various works incorporating endogenous fertility (Zhang and Zhang
(1995), Yoon and Talmain (2001)) produce the result that a pay-as-you-go
public pension system implies higher growth than a fully funded one. We
show that this result is crucially dependent on the existence of intrafamily
intergenerational gifts which can be assumed to be fully crowded out by the
existence of a public pension system. Fully crowded out gifts imply higher
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economic growth for an economy with a fully funded public pension system
than for an economy with an unfunded public pension system. The result is
driven by the fact that the growth decreasing e¤ect of lower pay-as-you-go
capital accumulation outweighs the growth enhancing e¤ect of lower pay-as-
you-go fertility. A public pension system framework with fully crowded out
gifts is therefore reestablishing the conventional view of growth diminishing
pay-as-you-go pension schemes.
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Part IV
On the Role of Pension Systems
in Economic Development and
Demographic Transition
12 Introduction
Many countries around the world su¤er from persistent underdevelopment.
In the year 2001 about 21% of the world population lived below the poverty
line of 1$/day (World Bank (2005)). While political and ecological reasons
can be responsible for this tragedy we are focusing on economic explanations.
A poverty trap, the economic term for the situation of an economy captured
in a low equilibrium per capita income can be caused by a variety of factors
like corruption, search externalities (Diamond (1982)), learning-by-doing ex-
ternalities (Brezis, Krugman, Tsiddon (1993)) or human capital externalities
(Azariadis, Drazen (1990)). Our work is focusing on the situation where a
demographic trap (Becker, Murphy, Tamura (1990)) is causing a situation of
an economy caught in a vicious circle of low human capital and high pop-
ulation growth which supports low equilibrium income and low education
investments. Recent studies show the importance of the amount of pension
payments (Boldrin, De Nardi, Jones (2005)) as well as the type of pension
systems (Groezen, Leers and Meijdam (2003), Sinn (2004), Holler (2007)) on
agentsfertility decisions. We pick up the idea that pension systems play an
important role in fertility dynamics aiming to analyze their e¤ect on long-run
per capita income and the income threshold needed to escape a poverty trap.
Moreover by including a subsistence level of retirement consumption as in
Galor and Weil (2000), we reproduce the historically observed inverted U-
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shaped fertility dynamics corresponding to increasing income levels.26. This
allows us to additionally study the inuence of di¤erent pension systems on
the timing of demographic transition.
In the past major changes in pension schemes were mainly due to socio-
logical or demographic changes. Bismarcks social security system introduced
in 1889 was for example only a reaction to the brake of familial ties due to the
o¤setting of industrial revolution. The generous pension schemes after the
secondWorld War for almost all western welfare states were also a reaction to
missing contributions from a whole generation. This highlights that changes
in the pension scheme were not seen as a tool to change economic variables
but were only adjusted to the changing environment. Inspired by Wigger
(1999) who showed that public pension system contributions are crowding
out private gifts from children to their parents we assume that a public
pension systems introduction triggers a break for interfamily transfers from
adults to the old. This revises the causality between economic variables and
pension design and shows that it can be used as a tool in development eco-
nomics. A variety of African countries that are about to reform their pension
systems could use this insight not only to react on demographic changes but
also to inuence economic development. As the rst African country Nige-
ria performed in 2004 a structural pension system reform by introducing a
multi-pillar scheme with mandatory pension contributions. Countries such
as Kenya, Senegal and Uganda will soon follow, showing that the political
and social structure of the countries seems to be mature enough to impose
structured public pension systems.
Starting point of our analysis is a model discussed by Ken Tabata (2003)
which emphasizes the importance of public education investments on human
capital accumulation and the possibility of being caught in a poverty trap.
In contrast to this paper we focus on the role of di¤erent pension systems on
26Works by Dyson and Murphy (1985), Kremer (1993), Lucas (1999) and Lee (2003)
give a detailed explanation of fertility reactions along increasing income levels.
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demographic transition and the determination of the human capital threshold
level needed to approach a high steady state equilibrium income.
To analyze the impacts of a change from one pension system to the other,
we compare education investments, equilibrium per capita income and fertil-
ity rates corresponding to an informally organized pension system and a pay-
as-you-go pension system. This enables us to answer the question whether the
introduction of a pay-as-you-go pension system can help developing countries
to escape a poverty trap. We choose to examine a pay-as-you-go pensions
system as - especially in developing countries - capital markets are not well es-
tablished making a fully funded pension system di¢ cult to introduce. Note
that the results derived from our comparison would also be true if we ex-
changed the unfunded with a funded pension system. Only the magnitude
of the e¤ects would change. The break of intrafamily ties that takes place
for any type of public pension system is the reason for the lower marginal
benet of fertility that drives our results. Further to the implications for de-
veloping countries we check the viability of a fertility-related pension system
introduction to slow down the decrease in fertility rates observed for most
developed countries and analyze the corresponding cost.
13 The Model
We assume a standard neoclassical constant returns to scale production sec-
tor for a small open economy. The interest rate is exogenously given and
constant. Capital is perfectly mobile implying that the capital labor ratio
k and the wage rate w are xed and constant. The Diamond type OLG
economy is populated by nitely living homogenous agents. Individuals live
for three periods: childhood, adulthood and retirement. During childhood
individuals consume wht, where  is a xed fraction of adult working time
needed to rear one child and ht is the amount of human capital an adult at
period t is holding. Human capital is determining the e¤ectiveness of labor.
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Total working income wht is therefore increasing in human capital. During
adulthood households decide on quantity nt and quality of children repre-
sented by education investments et. Education and fertility decisions are
implicitly determining the amount of savings st. Child quality investments
are like quantity investments expressed as working time cost. Following Ga-
lor and Weil (2000) we use a Cobb-Douglas utility function which allows us
to abstract from adult consumption without changing the qualitative results.
The population dynamics for the productive adult population are described
by Nt+1 = Ntnt. Retired people only consume and have no inuence on
household optimization. They are assumed to use up their whole savings
plus pension benets. Bequests are therefore excluded from the model.
We assume that individuals preferences are hierarchic in the sense that
individuals draw utility solely from retirement consumption as long as a
certain subsistence level c > 0 is not secured. Utility from having children
is only derived if the adult income level supports retirement consumption
above c. Along the lines of De la Croix and Doepke (2003) we assume that
adults are drawing utility from the existence and the future human capital
of their children which is determining future adult income and well being.
Individuals utility is represented by the following logarithmic additive
separable function:
ut =  log(ct+1) + (1  ) log(ntht+1) (51)
The discount factor  which is assumed to be smaller than 1 is determining
time preference as well as adult altruism toward children.
Throughout the paper we refer to the second part of the utility function
which reects the consumption good value of a child as the altruistic value
of child investments. While the word altruism implies that actions are made
despite own utility considerations which is not the case in our model we
stick to the word to pay tribute to earlier work we are building upon. Next
to the consumption good motive of fertility we additionally model the old-
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age security motive of fertility by incorporating ascending altruism (Wigger
(1999)). Following Morand (1999) ascending altruism of individuals prefer-
ences is captured through gifts from adult children to their parents during
retirement. The ascending altruistic part of preferences is therefore captured
in the composition of pension payments t+1 provided for the third period
of life. Inspired by the intergenerational ow theory (Caldwell (1982))
we assume that ascending altruism is only present for countries without a
mandatory public pension system.27 Two di¤erent pension system scenarios
are examined.
Informal pension system: This scenario is describing the situation
of developing countries where children are socially responsible for the well-
being of their retired parents. Pension benets are therefore dependent on
own fertility decisions. Nevertheless the pension contributions are socially
mandatory (World Bank (1991)) we use the terminology of ascending altru-
ism to describe the private intrafamilial transfer from adult children to their
old parents. The transfers  are assumed to be lump sum. We further assume
that the pension system is always budget balanced implying:
It+1 = n
I
t 
Pay-as-you-go pension system: This case examines economies with
a functioning public mandatory pay-as-you-go pension system. In the ab-
sence of bequests old-age support is the only motivation for private interfa-
milial gifts.28 If the state takes over the role of supporting the old generation
private gifts are therefore fully crowded out. A mandatory public pension
system further implies that pension payments do not depend on individual
27A more detailed description of this argument is provided by Holler (2007).
28Positive bequests would lead to children contributing to their parents pensions through
private gifts in expectation of bequests from their parents at the end of their lives. For a
detailed description of the di¤erent bequest motives see Zhang and Zhang (2001) or (WB
1991).
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fertility but on average fertility of the whole economy nt. Due to the nature
of a pay-as-you-go pension system being managed by a public authority bu-
reaucracy and corruption cost arise. In order to capture this especially for
developing countries important fact, we introduce the parameter B 2 (0; 1)
capturing the e¢ ciency of the public pension system in our pension formula.
High bureaucracy or corruption is represented by a low level of B and vice
versa.
Pt+1 = Bn
P
t 
We start by considering an e¢ cient system with B = 1. In subsection 6
we will relax this assumption and discuss its implications. Adults endowed
with a human capital level ht divide their after tax income htw   between
child cost (rearing cost nthtw + child education cost etnthtw) and savings
since they do not draw utility from consumption when adult. The adulthood
budget is therefore constrained by:
whtnt( + et) +  + st 6 wht (52)
Retirement consumption is nanced through the value of savings at period
t + 1 plus pension benets. Agents consume their whole retirement income
since we assume that bequests are zero. Following Galor and Weil (2000)
minimum retirement consumption is limited by a subsistence level c that
secures survival when old.
ct+1 = Rst + t+1 (53)
ct+1 > c (54)
Economic growth is solely determined by the evolution of human capital
over time. Following Tabata (2006) human capital accumulation is deter-
mined by education investments, adult human capital level ht and produc-
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tivity of the education sector determined by the parameters a; b;  and .
ht+1 = (a+ betht)
; ; a; b > 0; 0 <  < 1 (55)
Adult human capital is entering the accumulation formula to capture
the positive inuence of parental human capital on the childs future skills.
The positive a parameter is securing that future human capital is positive
in the case of zero education investments. Since  is smaller than one each
additional unit of education investment pays less in terms of additional future
human capital.
Equation (51) subject to (52), (53), (54) and (55) describe the household
optimization problem. For su¢ ciently high income supporting consumption
above the subsistence level the optimization leads to rst order conditions 1
to 4. Superscript P and I specify pay-as-you-go and informal pension system
variables.
eIt : 
whtRn
I
t
cIt+1
= (1  ) bht
a+ beItht
(FOC 1)
nIt : 
whtR( + e
I
t )
cIt+1
= (1  ) 1
nIt
+ 

cIt+1
(FOC 2)
ePt : 
whtRn
P
t
cPt+1
= (1  ) bht
a+ bePt ht
(FOC 3)
nPt : 
whtR( + e
P
t )
cPt+1
= (1  ) 1
nPt
(FOC 4)
Adults can either invest in child quantity (nt) or child quality (et). At
the optimum, marginal benet of the investments have to equal marginal
cost. FOC 1 and 3, describing optimal education decisions for both pension
systems, state that the marginal value of education measured in terms of
additional future human capital has to equal marginal cost of education mea-
sured in terms of retirement consumption. In other words at the point where
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marginal altruistic utility of additional future child income equals marginal
cost of reduced retirement consumption education investments are optimal.
Optimal Fertility decisions covered in FOC 2 and FOC 4 demand that mar-
ginal cost of a child are equal to marginal benets. FOC 2 further shows that
marginal child utility is split into an altruistic and a retirement consumption
part for the informal pension system. This is due to the existence of posi-
tive intrafamilial gifts. For an economy with a pay-as-you-go pension system
marginal child utility is solely determined by altruism (see FOC 4). The
rst order conditions further highlight that for both pension system cases,
a quality quantity trade-o¤ à la Becker and Barro (1988), is in place. High
investments in child education are implying low fertility and vice versa.
After describing the situation of relatively high income levels, support-
ing retirement consumption above or equal to the subsistence level, we focus
toward the low income cases. If income levels cannot support subsistence, re-
tirement consumption condition (54) becomes binding and optimal decisions
are described by FOC 5.
c = Rwht   (whtR( + et)  )nt   R (FOC 5)
13.1 Education
In the described model, education investments are solely driven by altruism
because they do not create any benet in the form of retirement consump-
tion. Therefore we assume parents to choose positive education investments
only if parental income is supporting a retirement consumption level above
subsistence. In other words investments in the quality of children only take
place if old-age survival is secured. The parameter assumptions connected
to this assumption are summarized in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 If a > (R+c)b
Rw
the human capital level supporting the subsis-
tence level of consumption h is lower than the human capital level that sup-
ports positive education investments h for both pension systems.
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To make things easier we skip the proof of Lemma 1 to subsection 2.3.
Due to our parameter assumptions we can observe two optimal education
results depending on whether income is below or above the positive education
investment threshold h.
ePt =
(
0
bht a
b(1 )ht
if ht 6 h
P
if ht > h
P
= a
b
eIt =
(
0
bRwht aRw b
b(1 )Rwht
if ht 6 h
I
if ht > h
I
= aRw+b
bRw
From optimal education decisions we follow that the threshold level needed
to make education decisions positive is di¤erent for both pension systems.
Proposition 18 The positive education threshold h is higher for the infor-
mal pension system case (h
I
> h
P
) implying that it takes higher income levels
to make education investments positive. From h
P
onwards pay-as-you-go ed-
ucation investments are higher than informal ones.
Proof. h
I
= h
P
+

Rw| {z }
>0
; ePt = e
I +

(1  )Rwht| {z }
>0
.
13.2 Fertility
Optimal fertility decisions are again dependent on the level of adult in-
come. Due to our parameter assumptions, we have to di¤erentiate between
the following three cases. The rst case of human capital below the sub-
sistence threshold h describes the situation where the subsistence retire-
ment consumption assumption is binding and education investments are zero.
h 6 ht 6 h corresponds to the second case where investments in child quality
are still zero but the income level is already high enough to lead to retirement
consumption above the subsistence level. The third case ht > h is reecting
the situation of relatively high human capital supporting positive education
investments.
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Based on the fact that average fertility is equal to individual fertility
because agents are homogenous, optimal pay-as-you-go fertility decisions are
described by:
nPt =
8>><>>:
c+R Rwht
 Rwht
R( 1)( wht)
( 1)+Rwht
bR( 1)( 1)( wht)
aRw+b( 1)( 1) bRwht
if ht 6 hP
if hP 6 ht 6 h
P
if ht > h
P
Optimal informal fertility decisions are represented by:
nIt =
8><>:
c+R Rwht
 Rwht
R( 1)( wht)
Rwht 
bR(1 )( 1)( wht)
bRwht aRw b
if ht 6 hI
if hI 6 ht 6 h
I
if ht > h
I
From equation (55) and Proposition 1, we know that for income levels
ht < h
P
human capital is constant at a. This enables us to directly compare
optimal fertility decisions for this income range. We follow that informal
and pay-as-you-go fertility are equal for income levels below the subsistence
threshold (ht < h). Optimal fertility results further imply that the income
level needed to surpass minimum retirement consumption is di¤erent for both
pension systems.
hI =
R + c
Rw
hP =
cRw +R2w p4cR2w2(   1) + (cRw +R2w)2
2R2w2
As long as income is below the threshold h, retirement consumption is
constant at c. In this case parents would like to give up retirement consump-
tion in order to have more children. This is not possible because retirement
consumption is at a level needed for survival and condition (54) becomes
binding. Implicitly the existence of this case demands that children are a
costly investment. In other words opportunity cost of children have to be
higher than benets (Rwh0 > ). If this would not be the case condition
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(54) could never become binding because having more children would not
decrease but increase retirement consumption. The assumption that retire-
ment consumption has to be high enough to secure survival together with
the fact that fertility has to be positive limits initial human capital to:
h0 > max


Rw
;
c+R
Rw

We allow fertility for the lowest possible income level to be smaller than
one. In these cases adults can only secure old-age survival by choosing fer-
tility rates less than 1. Our model therefore also captures income cases cor-
responding to shrinking adult population due to a lack of resources. n0 < 1
is only possible if 0 < c + (R   1) .29 This changes the minimum human
capital condition to:
h0 >
c+R
Rw
As income increases and surpasses h agents enjoy retirement consumption
above the subsistence level. Education investments are still zero (hP < ht <
h
P
). In this income range individuals use resources above the subsistence
level not only to have children but also to increase retirement consumption
through higher savings. Households therefore weight marginal utility of chil-
dren against marginal utility of consumption through higher savings (FOC
2 and FOC 4 with et = 0). Both pension systems still face the same level of
human capital. Comparing optimal decisions highlights that pay-as-you-go
fertility is smaller than informal fertility.
If the income level is high enough (ht > h) human capital starts to grow
due to positive education investments. The income level needed to impose
positive education investments and the amount of education investments is
29If 0 > c+(R 1) : ht > Rw > c+RRw . Reformulation gives us ht  Rw 6 ht  c+RRw
and Rwht    6 (Rwht   c R) < Rwht   c R . This shows that nt = c+R Rwht Rwht
can only be smaller than 1 if 0 < c + (R   1) .
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di¤erent for the two pension systems. From h
P
onwards pay-as-you-go human
capital is higher than informal human capital. This is the reason why a
simple comparison of informal and pay-as-you-go fertility decisions can not
be performed for the high income case. We skip this exercise to section 3
which focuses on a detailed examination of fertility dynamics.
13.3 Consumption
Budget constraints (2) and (3) together with optimal education and optimal
fertility decision determines retirement consumption.
cIt+1 =
(
c
R(wht   )
if ht 6 hI
if ht > hI
cPt+1 =
8>><>>:
c
R2wht(wht )
( 1)+Rwht
R2w( wht)( a+bht)
aRw+b( 1)( 1) bRwht
if ht 6 hP
if h
P > ht > hP
if ht > h
P
Proposition 19 A pay-as-you-go pension system economy demands lower
income levels to support consumption above a subsistence level than an in-
formal pension system economy (hP < hI).
Proof. Assume hI 6 hP and h = hP . Informal retirement consumption is
therefore equal or bigger than subsistence retirement consumption (cIt+1 =
R(wh   ) > c) and pay-as-you-go retirement consumption is equal to
retirement consumption (cPt+1 =
R2wh(wh )
( 1)+Rwh = c). It follows that R(wh 
) > R2wh(wh )
( 1)+Rwh . Reformulation gives us 1 >
Rwh
( 1)+Rwh . Because the
right hand side of this expression is bigger than 1, hI 6 hP can not be true,
proong that hI > hP .
At low income levels retirement consumption is constant at the subsis-
tence level. As a certain income threshold is surpassed individuals start
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to increase consumption. Lower income levels are needed to increase pay-as-
you-go retirement consumption above c than in the informal case. The result
is driven by the fact that marginal benet of having a child is lower for the
pay-as-you-go pension system since pension benets are independent on own
fertility decisions. Therefore for each income level the demand for children is
lower than in the informal pension systemmaking it easier for retirement con-
sumption to increase a subsistence level. All income levels above hP support
higher retirement consumption for a pay-as-you-go pension system economy.
This is the case because savings are higher due to lower fertility investments.
Through the help of the already derived insights we are now in the position
to proof Lemma 1 which is securing that education investments only take
place if income surpasses the subsistence level of consumption.
Proof of Lemma 1. h 6 h demands that hI 6 hI and hP 6 hP . Because
hI > hP and h
I
> h
P
, h 6 h is true if hI < hP . Now plug in hI = R+c
Rw
and
h
P
= a
b
to see that this is the case if a > (R+c)b
Rw
.
13.4 Savings
Education investment and fertility decisions are fully describing the behavior
of savings. Nevertheless in order to completely describe the model we produce
the following results for optimal savings:
sPt =
8>><>>:
2+( w+wc)ht
Rwht 
(wht )(( 1)+Rwht)
( 1)+Rwht
(wht )(aRw+b( 1)( 1) bRwht)
aRw+b( 1)( 1) bRwht
if ht 6 hP
if hP 6 ht 6 h
P
if ht > h
P
sIt =
8><>:
2+( w+wc)ht
Rwht 
(wht )( Rwht)
 Rwht
(wht )(aRw+b(1+( 1)) bRwht)
aRw+b bRwht
if ht 6 hI
if hI 6 ht 6 h
I
if ht > h
I
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Corresponding to fertility decisions informal and pay-as-you-go savings
are equal for income levels below the pay-as-you-go subsistence threshold hP
and lower for the range hP < ht < h
P
because informal fertility is higher.
Due to the fact that ht is di¤erent for human capital levels larger than h
P
a
simple direct comparison of the optimal decisions for this high income range
can not be performed.
13.5 Human Capital Accumulation and the Poverty
Trap
Now we focus on the di¤erences in human capital accumulation due to di¤er-
ences in education investments for the two pension systems. Equation (55)
and optimal education decisions determine human capital accumulation:
hPt+1 =
(
a   1(ht)


a+ bht a
(1 )

  P2 (ht)
if ht 6 h
P
if ht > h
P
hIt+1 =
(
a   1(ht)


a+  aRw b+bRwht
(1 )Rw

  I2(ht)
if ht 6 h
I
if ht > h
I
 1(ht) is a line and  2(ht) is a concave function (
@ 2(ht)
@ht
> 0; @
2 2(ht)
@h2t
< 0).
Notice that in our framework pay-as-you-go pension contributions are not
reducing investments in human capital. Depending on the parameter values
the described model has di¤erent steady state equilibria. We focus on the
case of a poverty trap30 since we wish to observe whether the di¤erent pension
systems have an inuence on the income level needed to escape the low long-
run per capita income equilibrium.
Proposition 20 If min

1 
b2
 
( 1)
+ b



1 
b2
 
 1   
Rw

;
30Situation where at least two stable (one low and one high) and one unstable steady
states exist. The variable value supporting the unstable equilibrium forms a threshold in
reaching the high stable steady state equilibrium.
73
b



1 
b2
 
 1   
Rw

> a > (b)
1
1  the model generates two stable
and one instable steady state equilibria for both pension systems. Initial in-
come lower than the poverty trap threshold h
P
trap leads to steady state equilibria
that equal each other for both pension systems. If initial human capital levels
are higher or equal to h
P
trap a pay-as-you-go public pension system supports a
higher steady state equilibrium than the informal pension system.
Proof. The assumption a > (b)
1
1  implying that a < h
P
secures
that a stable low income steady state (E1) exists for both pension sys-
tem cases because  1(h) intersects the 45 line. Now rearrange  I2(h) =
h to separate a linear and a power function. This gives us: bRwh| {z }
L(h)
=

h

 1

Rw
1  

+ aRw + b| {z }
R(h)
. The value h
0
that equals the slopes of the
two functions (L
0
(h
0
) = R
0
(h
0
)) is given by 

1 
b2
 
 1
. Now compare the
functional value of the two curves at h
0
. If the functional value of the power
function is lower than the functional value of the line R(h) intersects L(h)
twice because R(0) > 0 and@R(h)
@h
> 0. These two intersects are also solu-
tions to  I2(h) = h implying that  
I
2(h) has two intersects with the 45
 line.
R(h
0
) = bRw

1 
b2
 
 1
;L(h
0
) = Rw (1  )

1 
b2
 
 1
 1

+ aRw + b .
R(h
0
) < L(h
0
) if ( 1)


1 
b2
 
( 1)
+ b



1 
b2
 
 1   
Rw

> a. The
lower steady state equilibrium (EI2) is unstable, the higher one is stable
(EI3). Pay-as-you-go education investments are always higher than informal
ones. Therefore the described parameter restrictions also produce an unsta-
ble steady state equilibrium (EP2 ) and a stable steady state equilibrium (E
P
3 )
for the pay-as-you-go pension system. The last step of the proof secures the
existence of E2 and E3. In order to exist, the corresponding human capital
levels have to be larger than the threshold h. This is the case if h
0
> h
I
and
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a < h
P
. h
0
> h
I
if a < b



1 
b2
 
 1   
Rw

.
Proposition 21 A pay-as-you-go pension system economy is featured by a
smaller set of initial income conditions supporting a poverty trap equilibrium
because the human capital threshold needed to approach the high steady state
equilibrium is lower (h
P
trap < h
I
trap).
As long as income is below the education threshold h
P
both pension
systems have an identical steady state equilibrium at h = a. From h
P
onwards pay-as-you-go human capital is bigger than informal human capital
because education investments are always higher in the pay-as-you-go case
(see Proposition 1). The unstable steady state equilibrium determining the
poverty trap threshold level (htrap) is therefore lower for the pay-as-you-go
case (EP2 < E
I
2). Additionally the stable pay-as you go positive education
steady state is higher EP3 > E
I
3 . It follows that lower initial human capital
is needed (h
P
trap < h
I
trap) to approach an even higher stable steady state in
the case of a pay-as-you-go pension system. Figure 6 fully describes the be-
havior of both human capital accumulation equations and the corresponding
equilibria.
Figure 6: Human Capital Accumulation
ht
ht+1
P
h
I
h
sha
PE3
IE3
IE2
1E
PE2
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As long as education investments are zero future human capital of both
pension systems is constant and equal (EP1 = E
I
1). As income determining
human capital reaches the positive education threshold (h) which is lower for
the pay-as-you-go case, future human capital starts to rise. If initial human
capital is below (above) the level htrap which is corresponding to E2 the
economy approaches the stable low (high) steady state equilibrium E1(E3).
Throughout the literature initial human capital lower than htrap is known as
a poverty trapscenario.
Besides the described 3 steady state poverty trapscenario di¤erent pa-
rameter values support a variety of equilibria31. While we do not examine
each case in detail, one can state that all cases with di¤erent stable equi-
libria support a lower poverty trap threshold for the pay-as-you-go pension
system. All income levels above this threshold lead to higher long-run per
capita income for the pay-as-you-go pension system. This is the case because
education investments start at lower income levels and are always higher in
the pay-as-you-go case because marginal utility of procreation is lower.
Proposition 22 For all possible parameter values supporting di¤erent stable
equilibria the set of initial conditions leading to a stable high equilibrium is
larger for an economy with pay-as-you-go pension system compared to an
economy with an informally nanced pension system. All parameter values
corresponding to a stable steady state equilibrium which is di¤erent to h =
a lead to higher long-run per capita income for the pay-as-you-go case.
Only if a is the unique stable steady state equilibrium both pension systems
imply the same long-run per capita income.
After the comparison of equilibria and connected thresholds we focus on
the role of pension systems for demographic transition.
31Examples of further existing cases can be examined in Apendix B.
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14 Demographic Transition
While the term demographic transition describes the behavior of fertility
and mortality over time we only focus on fertility dynamics. Following other
economic studies we substitute time for income because historically, income is
increasing over time. One can observe that income and fertility are positively
related for low income regions while the opposite is true for high income
regions32. In order to enable our model to cover the empirical fact that
fertility rates are negatively dependent on income increases for high income
levels, we assume that parameters satisfy
R +  +  < 1 + : (56)
This additional parameter assumption enables our model to nicely cover the
pattern of historic fertility dynamics for the three income cases ht 6 h; h 6
ht 6 h and ht > h.
14.1 Malthusian State: ht 6 h
This low income scenario describes the situation where the subsistence level
of retirement consumption assumption is binding. Because individuals pri-
marily have to secure their survival and use income above the subsistence
level only to procreate, education investments are zero. The term Malthu-
sian state well describes this situation because additional income is directly
translated to higher fertility while consumption per capita stays constant. To
prove that this is the case, take the rst derivative of fertility with respect
to human capital.
@nPt
@ht
=
@nIt
@ht
=
Rw ((R   1)  + c)
(  Rwht)2
> 0
32For a detailed description of the Demographic Transition see for example Lee 2003.
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The second order derivative highlights that the fertility increases take place
at a decreasing rate.
@2nPt
@h2t
=
@2nIt
@h2t
=
2R2w2 ((R   1)  + c)
(  Rwht)3
< 0
Proof. As already explained, initial fertility is assumed to be lower than 1
implying that c + (R   1) > 0. Therefore @nt
@ht
> 0 and @
2nt
@h2t
< 0.
For low income levels our model reproduces the Malthusian view of an
economy that cannot prosper because income increases are only used for
additional procreation. As already outlined fertility is equal for both pen-
sion systems if retirement consumption is xed at c. In this economic stage
only the threshold level of income needed to support consumption above the
subsistence level depends on the pension system. A lower level of income
is needed to induce additional savings for the pay-as-you-go pension system
due to the fact that marginal benet of fertility is lower. This translates to
lower fertility and higher savings thus enabling consumption to surpass the
subsistence level at a lower income level.
14.2 Post-Malthusian State: h  ht  h
At the level h income becomes su¢ ciently high to support an optimal amount
of children under the constraint of a minimum retirement budget at the sub-
sistence level. This is implying that marginal utility of fertility and sav-
ings are equal. Agents still do not contribute working time to educate their
children. Income increases drive down marginal utility of children because
marginal cost of children, a xed part of adult income, is also increasing.
Therefore di¤erent to the Malthusian state during this economic stage addi-
tional income leads to lower fertility rates because the alternative investment
opportunity of additional retirement consumption through higher savings be-
comes more attractive. Calculate the rst order derivative of fertility with
respect to human capital and use equation (56) to prove that this is the case:
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@nPt
@ht
=
Rw(1  ) ( +R   1) 
((   1) +Rwht)2
< 0;
@nIt
@ht
=
Rw(1  )(R   1)
(  Rwht)2
< 0
The second derivative further show that for both pension systems the de-
crease in fertility connected to increasing income takes place at a decreasing
rate.
@2nPt
@h2t
=
2R2w2(   1) ( +R   1) 
((   1) +Rwht)3
> 0;
@2nIt
@h2t
=
2R2w2(1  ) (R   1) 
(  Rwht)3
> 0
As already mentioned, children pay less in the pay-as-you-go pension sys-
tem leading to higher opportunity cost of not investing in savings. Therefore
an economy with a pay-as-you-go pension system enters the Post-Malthusian
state at lower income levels than economies with informal pension systems.
Lower marginal benet of fertility for the pay-as-you-go pension system fur-
ther leads to lower demand for children and higher savings.
The combination of the Malthusian and Post-Malthusian state without
education investments already outlines the main features of demographic
transition: Income increases lead to increasing (decreasing) fertility for low
(high) income regions.
14.3 Post-Malthusian State with positive education in-
vestments: ht > h
Now education investments become positive. During this stage of economic
development fertility is not only competing against additional retirement
consumption but also against investments in the quality of children. From
the rst order derivative of fertility with respect to human capital together
with equation (56) we follow that the correlation between income and fertility
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is still negative.
@nPt
@ht
=
bRw(   1)(   1)( aRw + b( +R +       1))
(aRw + b(   1)(   1)   bRwht)2 < 0
@nIt
@ht
=
bRw(   1)(   1)( aRw + b(R   1))
(aRw + b   bRwht)2 < 0
The decrease in fertility due to increasing income is again decreasing for
the informal pension scheme.
@2nIt
@h2t
=
2b2R2w2(   1)(   1)( aRw + b(R   1))
(aRw + b   bRwht)3 > 0
Proof. Plug in h
I
which is the smallest viable human capital level connected
to positive education investments to obtain:
@2nIt
@h2t
=
<0z }| {
2b2R2w2(   1)(   1)( aRw + b(R   1))
(aRw   aRw

)3| {z }
<0 b ecause <1
. The numerator
and the denominator are smaller than zero implying that @
2nIt
@h2t
> 0. This is
also true for all human capital levels larger than h
I
.
The same is true for the pay-as-you-go pension scheme:
@2nPt
@h2t
=
2b2R2w2(   1)(   1)( aRw + b( +R +       1))
(aRw + b(   1)(   1)   bRwht)3 > 0
Proof. Plug in h
P
to get @
2nPt
@h2t
=
<0z }| {
2b2R2w2(   1)(   1)( aRw + b(R   1))
(aRw+b( 1)( 1) Rw a

)3
.
The numerator of the expression is negative implying that the second deriv-
ative is positive if a > b(1 )
Rw
. From the minimum initial human capital
constraint we can follow that h
P
> 
Rw
. Rewrite this condition to obtain
a > b
Rw
. Therefore a > b(1 )
Rw
has to be true and the second derivative is
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positive.
Now we are in the position to compare pay-as-you-go and informal fertility
for all income levels. From optimal fertility decisions and @n
P
t
@ht
< 0 we follow
that income levels above the pay-as-you-go education threshold h
P
support
lower fertility for the pay-as-you-go pension system.
Proof. We distinguish between two cases: h
I
> ht > h
P
and ht > h
I
. Sim-
ple algebraic reformulation of optimal fertility decisions shows that for the
rst case pay-as-you-go fertility evaluated at the point h
P
is lower than in-
formal fertility. Because fertility is decreasing with increasing human capital
and human capital is always higher for the pay-as-you-go pension system,
all income levels in the range support lower pay-as-you-go fertility. Com-
parison of optimal fertility results for the income range ht > h
I
again shows
that fertility is lower in the pay-as-you-go pension system if human capital
levels equal each other. Because fertility is again negatively dependent on
human capital which is higher for the pay-as-you-go pension system, we can
state that pay-as-you-go fertility is lower than informal fertility for all human
capital levels above h
P
.
Proposition 23 Pay-as-you-go fertility is equal to informal fertility for all
income levels below the pay-as-you-go subsistence threshold hP . At the income
level h both pension systems reach their fertility maximum. Pay-as-you-go
fertility is lower than informal fertility for income levels above hP .
As already discussed, the positive education threshold levels depend on
the pension system. Positive pay-as-you go education investments are sup-
ported by lower human capital levels than informal education investments.
The lower threshold is again based on the lower marginal benet of a child in
the pay-as-you-go pension system making it easier for education investments
to compete. If the threshold is surpassed, higher income leads to higher
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education investments at a decreasing rate.
@ePt
@ht
=
a
b(1  )h2t
> 0;
@2ePt
@h2t
=   2a
b(1  )h3t
< 0
@eIt
@ht
=
aRw + b
bRwh2t (1  )
> 0;
@2eIt
@h2t
=  2(aRw + b)
bRwh3t (1  )
< 0
For all income levels above the pay-as-you-go education threshold, agents
allocate more time to child quality in the pay-as-you-go pension system case.
As income is increasing the di¤erence in education investments of the two
pension system cases is decreasing because @e
P
t
@ht
<
@eIt
@ht
.
The three analyzed income cases also cover information on the observed
di¤erences in the timing of demographic transition between developing and
developed countries.
Proposition 24 The introduction of a mandatory pay-as-you-go public pen-
sion system to a country with an informal, fertility related pension system
shifts down the inverted U-shaped demand for children connected to income
increases. Therefore lower levels of income support an escape of the rst stage
of demographic transition where income increases lead to increasing fertility.
Lucas (2002) shows that while the demographic transition in the USA and
Western Europe already started at the end of the 19th century it took until
the 1950s to start in the African countries. While of course several factors
connected to the industrial revolution like mortality declines play a role in
explaining the di¤erent timing of demographic transition, the introduction
of a public pension system that rst took place in 1889 in Germany appears
to play a signicant role.
Our model also suggests that developing countries aiming to reduce pop-
ulation growth should introduce a pay-as-you-go pension system as one pillar
of their pension scheme. The fertility reduction is additionally accompanied
by a lower income threshold needed to escape a poverty trap equilibrium (see
proposition 4).
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Proposition 25 Post-Malthusian income levels support a trade-o¤ between
fertility and per capita income. A shift from a pay-as-you-go public pension
system to a fertility related informal pension system increases fertility rates
but decreases long-run per capita income.
Countries experiencing strong fertility declines due to income increases
can weaken the e¤ect, by introducing a fertility related clause in their pension
scheme. While such a policy will increase the demand for children, long-run
per capita income will decrease, highlighting the existing trade-o¤ between
fertility and per capita income.
The following subsection presents a numerical example to additionally
clarify and summarize fertility dynamics.
14.4 Numerical example
The last subsection already produced all necessary insights to compare the
fertility rates of the two pension systems for all development stages. Addi-
tionally, we are already able to outline the behavior of fertility over time.
The last missing insight to fully describe fertility dynamics is the di¤erence
in the strength of fertility reductions observed connected to income increases
for the two Post-Malthusian stages. Because an analytic comparison of the
partial derivatives does not produce a clear result, a numerical example is
performed.
Parameter values are set to satisfy the parameter conditions of a multiple
equilibria case (see Proposition 3).33
33Parameter values are set to:
a b w R c     
0:027 5 100 1:0420 1:6 0:9920 0:075 1 0:6 0:1
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Figure 7: Fertility dynamics
For very low human capital levels, income is too low to secure old-age
survival. Individuals do not procreate at all and the population becomes
extinct in one generation. We excluded these cases (ht < 0:024) from our
analysis by assuming that initial human capital is high enough to produce
positive fertility. Due to hierarchic preferences only income above the level
needed to secure a subsistence level of retirement consumption is invested in
procreation. In the low income region (0:024  hIt  0:029; 0:024  hPt 
0:028) marginal utility of fertility is larger than marginal utility of retirement
consumption. Individuals would like to give up retirement consumption in
order to have more children which is not possible since retirement budget
is already at a minimum. In other words, life-time income is too low to
equal marginal utility of both investment opportunities. As human capital is
increasing, the cost of having children is also increasing. This, together with
higher fertility drives down the marginal benet of procreation. At the human
capital level h (hP = 0:028;hP = 0:29) individual income is high enough
to equal marginal utility of fertility and savings. Further income increases
reduce marginal utility of fertility by higher marginal cost. The income level
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equalizing marginal utility of fertility and retirement consumption is lower
for the pay-as-you-go pension system since the marginal benet of children is
lower. Additional income further drives down marginal utility of retirement
consumption and fertility. At the level h (h
P
= 0:12;h
I
= 0:126) the marginal
benet of education equals the marginal benet of the two other investment
opportunities and education investments become positive. The income level
needed to make education a competing investment is lower in the pay-as
you-go pension system since marginal benet of children is lower. Positive
child quality investments increase the increasing e¤ect of higher income on
the marginal cost of fertility resulting in an even stronger decline of fertility.
15 Bureaucracy and Corruption
Transferring income from the working generation to retirees via a public
system clearly causes cost. While part of these are transparent such as op-
erating cost, others like bureaucracy or corruption are di¢ cult to measure.
These costs are country specic and can be considered especially signicant
for least developed countries, where legal security is low and corruption is
soaring. While informal decisions are equal to the former case, positive bu-
reaucracy cost (B < 1) change optimal pay-as-you-go fertility decisions and
retirement consumption to:
nPt =
8>><>>:
c+R Rwht
B Rwht
R( 1)( wht)
B( 1)+Rwht
bR( 1)( 1)( wht)
aRw+b( 1)( 1)B bRwht
if ht 6 hP
if hP 6 ht 6 h
P
if ht > h
P
cPt+1 =
8>><>>:
c
R2wht(wht )
B( 1)+Rwht
R2w( wht)( a+bht)
aRw+b( 1)( 1)B bRwht
if ht 6 hP
if h
P > ht > hP
if ht > h
P
The new results highlight that for income levels below the pay-as-you-
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go subsistence threshold hP fertility in the pay-as-you-go pension system is
now lower than fertility in the informal pension system. Retirement con-
sumption is still xed at c. The utility generated by an informal pension
system economy is therefore higher than for a pay-as-you-go pension system
economy. Income levels supporting a post-malthusian state are still lower for
the pay-as-you-go pension system economy but the di¤erence is decreasing if
bureaucracy costs are increasing. This is due to the fact that lower B drives
down life time income translating into higher income increases needed to
equal marginal utility of retirement consumption and fertility. Income levels
above hP lead to pay-as-you-go retirement consumption above the subsis-
tence level. From a certain income level onward the e¤ect on retirement
consumption becomes strong enough to compensate for lower fertility and
the pay-as-you-go pension system becomes again utility maximizing.
Proposition 26 A traditional, informal pension system is optimal if income
levels are very low or bureaucracy costs are large.
By including B < 1 our model covers income cases where an informally
nanced pension system is dominating a publicly nanced pay-as-you-go
scheme. This underlines that country specic conditions have to be con-
sidered in deciding whether the introduction of a public pension system is a
viable development device.
16 Conclusion
Through the comparison of a pay-as-you-go and an informal pension system
we show that the type of pension system has an impact on economic devel-
opment and population growth. The introduction of a public pension system
breaks the link between individual fertility and pension benets that can be
observed for traditional societies. Marginal benet of procreation is therefore
lower for the pay-as-you-go pension system, leading to lower demand for chil-
dren. Reecting on the quantity/quality trade o¤, pay-as-you-go education
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investments are higher and start at lower income levels. This is the reason
why economic take-o¤ to a high long-run equilibrium per capita income is
supported by lower income levels for a pay-as-you-go pension system econ-
omy. Next to the lower poverty trap threshold, education investments under
the pay-as-you-go pension scheme which exceed informal ones, imply larger
per capita income for the high steady state equilibrium.
A switch from an informal- to a pay-as-you-go pension system leads to
decreasing marginal utility of fertility, increasing high steady state equilib-
rium income and a possibility to escape a poverty trap. Nevertheless, if
bureaucracy costs are considered, the described positive e¤ects of a pay-as-
you-go pension system can be accompanied by a reduction in utility for very
low income or high corruption cases. Countries experiencing a Malthusian
stageof their economy with human capital levels below the pay-as-you-go
subsistence threshold are worse o¤ if a public pension system is introduced.
This result is supported by even higher income levels if bureaucracy costs are
soaring.
In addition, we show that developed countries facing a sharp decrease
in fertility can weaken this e¤ect by introducing a fertility related clause in
their pension scheme. While such a policy could absorb part of the negative
demographic trend it comes at a cost of reduced long run equilibrium per
capita income.
Our results further underline that a pay-as-you-go pension system needs a
lower income level to escape the Malthusian stageof an economy because
investments, contrary to fertility, are more competitive. This allows us to
conclude that pension systems appear to play a vital role in the timing of
demographic transition. The divergence of pension systems for developed
and developing countries can therefore partly explain the observed regional
di¤erences in the behavior of population dynamics.
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Abstract
To underline the importance of intergenerational transfers for the growth
implications of pension systems our study examines the existence of intrafamily
transfers that dene the old-age security motive of fertility. An OLG model with
a mixed procreation motive is employed to show that the strength of altruism
decides about whether socially optimal unfunded pension contributions are fully
crowding out intrafamily gifts. We show that under realistic assumptions about
altruism agents of an economy with a public pay-as-you-go pension system do
not consider the insurance value of procreation. Our results imply that pension
reform implications for countries with a public pension system should be based
on models that only incorporate the consumption good motive of fertility. This
reestablishes the conventional view about the fact that unfunded public pension
schemes diminish economic growth.
In the context of fully crowded out intrafamily gifts our work further analyses
the implications of di¤erent pension systems. We show that the introduction
of a public pension system to a developing economy with informally nanced
pension benets reduces fertility and stimulates economic growth. Additionally,
we highlight that in a framework of fully crowded out gifts a fully funded public
pension system results in higher economic growth than a pay-as-you-go public
pension system. This is the case because the growth enhancing e¤ect of higher
fully funded savings is dominating the growth decreasing e¤ect of higher fully
funded fertility.
We further expand our model to a framework of endogenously chosen fertil-
ity and education investments and examine whether di¤erent pension systems
a¤ect the set of initial human capital conditions capturing an economy in a
low steady state equilibrium income. This shows that education investments
are higher and start at lower income levels for a pay-as-you-go pension system
economy compared to an informal, fertility related one. The income threshold
needed to escape a poverty trapis therefore lower if a pay-as-you-go pension
system is in place. Moreover, unless the economy is caught in the low income
steady state, a pay-as-you-go pension system supports higher equilibrium in-
come. In addition we highlight that pension systems inuence the timing of
the demographic transition through their di¤erent valuations of fertility. This
produces an explanation for the observed di¤erences between developed and
developing countries.
Zusammenfassung
Diese Studie behandelt interfamiliäre Transfers und untersucht, ob diese als
Alterssicherungsmotiv für Fertilitätsentscheidungen ausschlaggebend sind. Her-
vorgehoben wird dabei die Bedeutung dieser Transfers für den Vergleich unter-
schiedlicher Pensionssysteme und ihrer Auswirkung auf das Wirtschaftswachs-
tum. Die Arbeit macht deutlich, dass in einer Ökonomie mit umlagenanziertem
Pensionssystem und realistischen Altruismus Annahmen das Alterssicherungsmo-
tiv in der Geburtenentscheidung nicht berücksichtigt wird. Die vorgestellten Re-
sultate implizieren, dass die Analyse einer Pensionsreform für Länder mit einem
bestehenden ö¤entlichen Pensionssystem in einem Modellrahmen zu erfolgen
hat, der Kinder ausschließlich als Konsumgüter betrachtet.
Unter derartigen Modellannahmen werden unterschiedliche Pensionssysteme
miteinander verglichen. Dies macht deutlich, dass die Implementierung eines
ö¤entlich nanzierten Pensionssystems in einem Entwicklungsland, das ein in-
formelles Pensionssystem aufweist, die Geburtenrate senkt und das Wirtschafts-
wachstum erhöht. Der Vergleich von ö¤entlich nanziertem Umlage- und Kapi-
taldeckungsverfahren macht zusätzlich deutlich, dass Kapitaldeckungsverfahren
zu höherem Wirtschaftswachstum führen.
Erweitert man dieses Modell um endogen bestimmte Bildungsinvestitionen,
so führt ein ö¤entlich nanziertes Umlageverfahren im Vergleich zu einem in-
formell organisierten Pensionssystem zu höheren Bildungsinvestitionen, die bere-
its bei niedrigeren Einkommensniveaus starten. Daher benötigt ein Umlagever-
fahren ein geringeres Einkommensniveau um einer Armutsfalle zu entkommen.
Darüber hinaus unterstützt ein Umlageverfahren durchwegs Gleichgewichte mit
höherem Einkommen, mit Ausnahme besonders niedriger Anfangsausstattun-
gen. Des Weiteren weißt die Studie darauf hin, dass Pensionssysteme den Zeit-
punkt des Demographischen Übergangs beeinussen.
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